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Article  
The Economic Rehabilitation of 
Offenders: Recommendations of the Model 
Penal Code (Second) 
Kevin R. Reitz
†
 
  INTRODUCTION   
The project to produce a Model Penal Code (Second) of Sen-
tencing is nearly finished. It is the first-ever revision of the 
Model Penal Code (MPC or Code), more than fifty years after 
the original Code was completed. The most recent Tentative 
Draft to win approval by the American Law Institute (ALI) (the 
third of four volumes for the project as a whole) addresses eco-
nomic penalties, along with a number of other subjects relating 
to “offenders in the community.”
1
  
Five interlocking provisions of Tentative Draft No. 3 are 
devoted to economic penalties, including sections on general 
principles, restitution, fines, asset forfeitures, and costs, fees, 
and assessments. They are the product of more than two years 
of study and debate, and respond to enormous changes in the 
landscape of financial penalties since the original Code was 
produced. On the whole, the ALI found the current state of 
American law on economic sanctions to be under-examined, 
unprincipled, and counterproductive to goals of public safety.
2
 
 
†  James Annenberg La Vea Professor of Law, University of Minnesota 
Law School; Reporter for American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code: Sen-
tencing Project. This Article represents the author’s views, not official Ameri-
can Law Institute policies or positions. Copyright © 2015 by Kevin R. Reitz. 
 1. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, at xix (Tentative Draft No. 3, 
2014) (approved with amendments May 19, 2014). The draft also addressed 
pre-charge diversion from prosecution, deferred adjudication, probation, 
postrelease supervision, sentence revocation, and collateral consequences of 
conviction. 
 2. A small but important literature on economic penalties has been grow-
ing in academic and advocacy communities, especially in the last five years. 
See generally AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, IN FOR A PENNY: THE RISE OF 
AMERICA’S NEW DEBTORS’ PRISONS (2010), available at https://www.aclu.org/ 
files/assets/InForAPenny_web.pdf; ALICIA BANNON ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR 
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The ALI’s recommended statutory reforms would therefore sig-
nificantly alter the criminal codes of every state. 
It is well known that the United States is the most puni-
tive society in the world in its use of incarceration,
3
 and is in 
the upper tier in use of the death penalty.
4
 Recently, awareness 
has been growing that the United States is also an outlier for 
 
JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A BARRIER TO REENTRY (2010), available at 
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Fees%20and%20Fines
%20FINAL.pdf; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PROFITING FROM PROBATION: 
AMERICA’S “OFFENDER-FUNDED” PROBATION INDUSTRY (2014), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0214_ForUpload_0.pdf; 
RACHEL L. MCLEAN & MICHAEL D. THOMPSON, COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS 
JUSTICE CTR., REPAYING DEBTS (2007), available at http://csgjusticecenter.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2012/12/repaying_debts_full_report-2.pdf; Traci R. Burch, 
Fixing the Broken System of Financial Sanctions, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. 
POL’Y 539 (2011); Alexes Harris et al., Drawing Blood from Stones: Legal Debt 
and Social Inequality in the Contemporary United States, 115 AM. J. SOC. 1753 
(2010); Wayne A. Logan & Ronald F. Wright, Mercenary Criminal Justice, 
2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1175; R. Barry Ruback & Valerie Clark, Economic Sanc-
tions in Pennsylvania: Complex and Inconsistent, 49 DUQ. L. REV. 751 (2011); 
Breanne Pleggenkuhle, The Effect of Legal Financial Obligations on Reentry 
Experiences (July 2012) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of Mis-
souri–Saint Louis). In 2014, National Public Radio reported on a yearlong in-
vestigation into user fees imposed by courts and corrections agencies in a se-
ries of broadcasts called “Guilty and Charged.” Guilty and Charged (National 
Public Radio broadcast May 23, 2014), available at http://www.npr.org/series/ 
313986316/guilty-and-charged. 
 3. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN 
THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 1 (Jeremy 
Travis et al. eds., 2014); Jonathan Simon, Mass Incarceration: From Social 
Policy to Social Problem, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING AND 
CORRECTIONS 23, 23 (Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz eds., 2012). The United 
States prison rate peaked at year-end 2009 and has been in slight decline for 
the last several years. See E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
PRISONERS IN 2013, at 1 (2014). In 2010 national prison populations dropped 
by 0.3% (the first downturn since 1972), PAUL GUERINO ET AL., BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2010, at 1 (2011), in 2011 they decreased 
0.9%, E. ANN CARSON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
PRISONERS IN 2011, at 1 (2012), in 2012 by 1.8%, E. ANN CARSON & DANIELA 
GOLINELLI, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2012: TRENDS IN 
ADMISSIONS AND RELEASES, 1991–2012, at 23 (2013), and in 2013 they in-
creased by 0.3%, CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 
2013, supra. Like prison populations, community-supervision populations have 
been in slight decline for the past several years. See ERIN J. HERBERMAN & 
THOMAS P. BONCZAR, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PROBATION AND 
PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2013, at 1 (2014); LAURA M. MARUSCHAK & 
THOMAS P. BONCZAR, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PROBATION AND 
PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2012, at 1 (2013) (“[T]he number of adults un-
der community supervision declined for the fourth consecutive year.”). 
 4. Death Sentences and Executions, AMNESTY INT’L (Mar. 26, 2014), 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/death-sentences-and-executions 
-2013.  
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its high rates of probation and parole supervision.
5
 America 
reached its exceptional position during a period of punitive ex-
pansionism that began in the early 1970s and continued for 
nearly forty years.
6
 Although not widely appreciated, the na-
tion’s use of economic penalties surged in tandem with other 
punishments in the expansionist era.
7
 Today’s financial sanc-
tions may be just as excessive by worldwide standards as 
American incarceration rates. 
Since the Model Penal Code (First) was approved in 1962, 
there has been steady growth in fine amounts, asset forfeitures, 
and a congeries of costs, fees, and assessments levied against 
criminal offenders.
8
 At the same time, there has been a wave of 
 
 5. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.03 note e (Tentative Draft 
No. 3, 2014) (analyzing United States, Council of Europe, Canadian, and Aus-
tralian data; finding that average reported probation supervision rates among 
American states are roughly seven times the average rates among reporting 
European countries, four times the Canadian rate, approximately five times 
that in England and Wales, and seven times that in Australia); id. § 6.09 cmt. 
d (“[T]he national U.S. parole supervision rate for 2011 was five times that in 
Australia, seven times that in Denmark, and four times that in Austria.”); 
Dirk van Zyl Smit & Alessandro Corda, American Exceptionalism in Parole 
Release and Supervision: A European Perspective, in AMERICAN 
EXCEPTIONALISM IN CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (Kevin R. Reitz ed., forthcoming 
2015) (on file with author); Michelle S. Phelps, The Paradox of Probation: Un-
derstanding the Expansion of an “Alternative” to Incarceration During the 
Prison Boom 16 (Sept. 2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton Uni-
versity) (proposing and defining “the term ‘mass probation’ to describe the rap-
id build-up (and racial disproportionality) of probation supervision rates”). 
 6. See HENRY RUTH & KEVIN R. REITZ, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME: 
RETHINKING OUR RESPONSE 18–27, 67–72 (2003). 
 7. See Katherine Beckett & Alexes Harris, On Cash and Conviction: 
Monetary Sanctions As Misguided Policy, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 509, 
512 (2011) (“[L]egislatures have authorized many new fees and fines in recent 
years, and criminal justice agencies increasingly impose them. This trend co-
incides with the rapid expansion of the penal apparatus that began in the late 
1970s . . . .”); Pleggenkuhle, supra note 2, at 8 (“Evidence suggests both the 
frequency and amount of legal financial obligation have increased in the past 
decades.”). 
 8. On the growing importance of economic sanctions in United States 
sentencing policy, see BANNON ET AL., supra note 2, at 1 (“Across the board, we 
found that states are introducing new user fees, raising the dollar amounts of 
existing fees, and intensifying the collection of fees and other forms of criminal 
justice debt such as fines and restitution.”); REBEKAH DILLER, BRENNAN CTR. 
FOR JUSTICE, THE HIDDEN COSTS OF FLORIDA’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE FEES 5 
(2010) (“From 1996 through 2007, the Florida Legislature created or author-
ized more than 20 new categories of legal financial obligations (‘LFOs’) – sur-
charges, fees, and other monetary obligations – related to criminal cases and 
violations. Many of these surcharges and fees have been increased during the 
last two years.”); Beckett & Harris, supra note 7, at 512; Ronald P. Corbett, 
Jr., The Burdens of Leniency: The Changing Face of Probation, 99 MINN. L. 
REV. 1697, 1712, 1715 (2015) (“[S]ince the 2008 recession, forty-eight states 
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statutory and constitutional provisions that authorize or man-
date victim restitution as part of criminal sentences.
9
 The im-
pulses toward growth have included the generalized thrust to-
ward greater severity in sanctioning, the resurgence of crime 
victims as quasi-parties to criminal proceedings,
10
 and sus-
tained budgetary shortfalls that have caused public and private 
entities to look to offenders as new sources of revenue.  
The cumulative totals of monetary penalties must be con-
sidered rather than the discrete amount of each payment that 
is ordered.
11
 Studies of criminal justice debt in individual states 
have found average obligations in the thousands of dollars, of-
ten supplemented by child support obligations (which often 
continue to accrue during periods of incarceration).
12
 In many 
cases, offenders’ total debt burdens overwhelm their abilities to 
pay while establishing minimally secure financial lives for 
themselves and their families.
13
 The widespread practice in 
 
have increased the fees to offenders in criminal court. . . . [A]mong the services 
that were once provided for free and are now charged for are supervision costs, 
drug test costs, and treatment costs. Offenders at least in some jurisdictions 
pay for their arrest warrants, DNA samples, and GPS monitoring costs.”); 
Ruback & Clark, supra note 2, at 752–53 (“[I]n the past two decades, economic 
sanctions have become increasingly more common, being imposed on sixty-six 
percent of prisoners in 2004, up from twenty-five percent in 1991. Moreo-
ver . . . these sanctions are likely to be used more frequently in the future.”); 
Ronald F. Wright & Wayne A. Logan, The Political Economy of Application 
Fees for Indigent Criminal Defense, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2045, 2054 (2006) 
(asserting that application fee laws have exploded in use: the number of juris-
dictions using them increased by thirty percent from 1994 to 2004); 
Pleggenkuhle, supra note 2, at 8. 
 9. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04A cmt. e (Preliminary 
Draft No. 10, 2014); PEGGY M. TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., CRIME VICTIM RIGHTS AND 
REMEDIES 155–57 (2d ed. 2010). 
 10. See TOBOLOWSKY, supra note 9, at 234.  
 11. See Pleggenkuhle, supra note 2, at 5–6 (“Although each fee is typically 
described as a nominal amount, evidence indicates small fees can accumulate 
quickly. Research suggests offenders can be responsible for up to 17 different 
types of financial obligation at various points throughout their sentence, in-
cluding defense attorney fees, drug testing, court costs, mandatory classes or 
therapy, and supervision fees.”). 
 12. See MCLEAN & THOMPSON, supra note 2, at 7 (reporting average resti-
tution awards of $3,500 in one jurisdiction); ALAN ROSENTHAL & MARSHA 
WEISSMAN, CTR. FOR CMTY. ALT. JUSTICE STRATEGIES, SENTENCING FOR 
DOLLARS: THE FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF A CRIMINAL CONVICTION 3, 17–
18 (2007) (reporting a total of over $7,000 in financial penalties for a single 
DWI conviction in New York state; illustrating the growth of child support ar-
rears during incarceration); Harris et al., supra note 2, at 1771 (finding that in 
Washington state the average amount owed for supervision fees, court costs, 
and other fees was approximately $2,500). 
 13. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 2, at 5–6; BANNON ET AL., 
supra note 2, at 1–2; MCLEAN & THOMPSON, supra note 2, at 7–8; Burch, su-
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American law is to impose economic penalties with uncertain 
chances of collection and with insufficient concern for their 
long-term impact on offender reintegration, recidivism, and 
public safety.
14
 The new MPC accordingly calls for an across-
the-board rethinking of such penalties and significant reduc-
tions in their use.
15
 
I.  ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND THE GOALS OF THE 
SENTENCING SYSTEM   
Part I of this Article will examine how much value econom-
ic sanctions provide when measured by mainstream criminal 
justice policies such as retribution, rehabilitation, deterrence, 
and incapacitation. In effect, Part I will prepare a scorecard of 
the costs and benefits of economic penalties. One “scoring” rule 
is that benefits will not be counted unless they advance recog-
nized goals of the sentencing system. 
A. PROPORTIONALITY AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 
One function of criminal sentences is to punish offenders—
and some people believe this should be the sole or overriding 
goal of a just sentencing system.
16
 In present-day American cul-
 
pra note 2, at 539. 
 14. As with probation and parole, there is evidence that America’s use of 
collateral consequences of conviction is also more extensive than in other 
countries. See Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convic-
tions: Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 457 
(2010) (comparing the use of collateral sanctions in the United States, Eng-
land, Canada, and South Africa). 
 15. The new Code’s approach is roughly continuous with the policy of the 
Model Penal Code (First). See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, PART 
I §§ 6.01–7.09 (1985). The official Comment to original section 7.02 began with 
the clear statement that “[t]his section articulates the policy of the Model Code 
to discourage use of fines as a routine or even frequent punishment for the 
commission of crime.” Id. § 7.02 cmt. 1. The new Code also shares concerns 
and goals expressed by the 1973 National Advisory Commission on Criminal 
Justice Standards. See NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
STANDARDS & GOALS, CORRECTIONS 162–63 (1973) (commenting that fines 
“based on the financial means of the defendant can have disparate and de-
structive results, particularly for the poor. In many jurisdictions, the fine is a 
revenue device unrelated in practice to concepts of corrections or crime reduc-
tion.”). 
 16. See, e.g., ANDREW VON HIRSCH & ANDREW ASHWORTH, 
PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING 12–33 (2005); Paul H. Robinson, Competing 
Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful, Deontological, and Empirical, 65 
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 145, 160–61 (2008) (contrasting Robinson’s preferred pro-
gram, in which desert specifies the particular amount of punishment that 
should be imposed on offenders, with the approach of the revised Model Penal 
Code). 
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ture, however, economic sanctions are not worth very much on 
the retributive scale. A sentencing judge’s pronouncement of a 
large fine delivers little in retributive satisfaction. Americans 
do not experience catharsis when reading a headline such as, 
“Violent Felon Fined $10,000!” Serious crimes warrant signifi-
cant penalties under most theories of just deserts, retribution, 
or proportionality in sentencing—and, over the past several 
decades, the metric of “serious” punishment in American law 
and culture has been prison time. That this is regrettable does 
not change the fact that it is a reality. Measured in public per-
ception, the economic sanctions most offenders are capable of 
paying are of scant punitive value when compared with incar-
ceration. 
Because of the low retributive valuation of economic sanc-
tions, American legal systems have not found it possible to use 
them as substitutes for jail or prison terms—and it is likely 
they do not function as substitutes for probationary sentences 
either. Instead, in American legal culture, fines, restitution, 
fees, and surcharges are add-ons, rarely viewed as condign sen-
tences in themselves. This is not the case worldwide. In at least 
some European countries, fines are now the modal punishment 
for most crimes. In Germany, the widespread use of financial 
penalties was part of a successful effort to dramatically reduce 
the use of short prison terms.
17
 Some Scandinavian countries 
use “day fine” systems that assess proportionate monetary pun-
ishments according to the wealth and earning power of each de-
fendant.
18
 When similar programs were attempted in pilot sites 
in the United States, however, they did not gain traction.
19
 
 
 17. Fines are the mainstay of criminal sentencing policy in Germany. See 
FED. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, SECOND PERIODICAL REPORT ON CRIME AND 
CRIME CONTROL IN GERMANY, ABRIDGED VERSION 81 (2007) (“In 2004, the 
sanctions given to 94% of all persons convicted under general criminal law 
were either fines (80.6%) or suspended prison sentences (13.7%).”). 
 18. See NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND 
PROBATION: INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING 
SYSTEM 143–44 (1990) (discussing the use of day fines in Scandinavia). In con-
trast, see Ruback & Clark, supra note 2, at 754 (“[F]ines in the United States 
tend to be used primarily in courts of limited jurisdiction, particularly traffic 
courts. Fines are also used in lower courts for minor offenses, such as shoplift-
ing, especially for first-time offenders who have enough money to pay the fi-
ne.”). 
 19. On the comparative failure of the United States to make use of fines 
as alternatives to imprisonment, see Pat O’Malley, Politicizing the Case for 
Fines, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 547, 547, 549 (2011) (“[M]ost common-
law countries and many in Europe use discretionary fines along the lines of 
those available in the United States, and although these have problems, as do 
all sanctions, they are almost everywhere [outside the United States] the pre-
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The failure of economic penalties to register on the retribu-
tive scale in American culture has many effects. One is that 
economic sanctions are assessed in small or great amounts, and 
are allowed to compound, with little regard for their effects on 
proportionality in punishment.
20
 Nor does anyone pay much at-
tention to the retributive value of principled uniformity of pun-
ishments imposed. The amounts assessed against individual 
offenders can vary wildly from county to county within a state, 
and vary even among persons with similar offenses and crimi-
nal histories.
21
 
In sum, economic penalties—as they are administered in 
United States criminal justice systems—yield small retributive 
benefits, and have not been held to retributive strictures of 
proportionality, fairness, and reasonable uniformity in pun-
ishment. 
B. UTILITARIAN ANALYSES OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 
The utilitarian scorecard for economic penalties yields 
weak or mixed results. This section will discuss rehabilitation, 
deterrence, and incapacitation in turn. 
1. Rehabilitation 
Rehabilitation does not play a major role in the design and 
administration of financial penalties. That is not to say that the 
rehabilitative potential of economic sanctions is zero. One plau-
 
dominant sentencing option. . . . Although, in Europe, this substitution of fines 
for at least some short terms of imprisonment appeared at the end of the 19th 
century, the same thing did not occur in the United States.”). 
 20. See Beckett & Harris, supra note 7, at 520 (“Because monetary penal-
ties in the United States are supplements to penalties that already are com-
paratively severe, directly and adversely impact the partners as well as chil-
dren of the criminally convicted . . . and typically remain in effect long after all 
other elements of criminal sentences are completed, the imposition of substan-
tial and supplementary monetary penalties is disproportionate to the offense 
and, hence, approaches vengeance rather than retribution.”). 
 21. See Ruback & Clark, supra note 2, at 767–70. In this study, the array 
of economic sanctions in use varied strikingly from county to county, as did the 
mean and median dollar amounts of sanctions imposed on individual offend-
ers. As Ruback and Clark explained, “[a]cross the sixty-seven counties in 
Pennsylvania, the number of different economic sanctions imposed varied from 
forty to one hundred forty-seven . . . . Most of the variation between counties 
in the number of different economic sanctions imposed came from sanctions 
unique to each county.” Id. at 767. See also Pleggenkuhle, supra note 2, at 9–
10 (“Despite existing legislation that mandates certain financial penalties for 
all offenders, studies continue to demonstrate offender characteristics matter 
in regard to who receives economic sanctions . . . . Most research suggests 
nonviolent offenders, particularly those with drug offenses, had increased 
amounts of fees and fines associated with their sentence.”). 
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sible narrative could be grounded in specific deterrence. Such a 
theory would posit that the pain of paying financial sanctions 
might teach offenders not to repeat the experience—and would 
add to other incentives (like the threat of imprisonment) to 
avoid reoffending.
22
 The presence of criminal justice debt might 
also focus the minds of some offenders as a positive stressor, 
making them bear down to find a job and be responsible with 
money in order to dig themselves out of the hole.
23
 Financial ob-
ligations may cause offenders to lean more heavily on the sup-
port of their families, thus strengthening family ties.
24
 There is 
also a line of thought that payment of restitution to crime vic-
tims may be therapeutic, if the offender believes he has made 
amends for his actions and has taken a meaningful step toward 
regaining acceptance in the community.
25
 
The rehabilitative hopes we might attach to financial pen-
alties are not fantastical, but there is not much evidence in 
their favor. The effectiveness of deterrence is probably greatest 
for certain types of crimes (more on deterrence in a moment), 
 
 22. By Professor Ruback’s reading of the literature, there is “some evi-
dence” that, compared with incarceration, fines are “about as effective in de-
terring future crime.” R. Barry Ruback, The Abolition of Fines and Fees: Not 
Proven and Not Compelling, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 569, 570 (2011); 
see also Pleggenkuhle, supra note 2, at 3–4. 
 23. See Pleggenkuhle, supra note 2, at 121–30 (finding this to be the case 
among some ex-offenders, although others reported the presence of criminal 
justice debt as a negative stressor that could lead to discouragement, depres-
sion, exacerbation of other mental illnesses, and return to drug use). 
 24. See MORRIS & TONRY, supra note 18, at 114 (“[I]ronically, imposition 
of fines on at least some impecunious offenders may serve preventive ends by 
catalyzing family and social support.”). 
 25. See CYNTHIA A. KEMPINEN, PA. COMM’N ON SENTENCING, PAYMENT OF 
RESTITUTION AND RECIDIVISM 3–4 (2002) (“Individuals who paid a higher per-
centage of their ordered restitution were less likely to commit a new crime. 
Moreover, the payment of fines was not found to have the same effect of lower-
ing recidivism. This suggests that it is the act of reparation that is important, 
not merely the act of payment itself.”). This theory is recognized in current 
Model Penal Code drafting. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04A 
cmt. g (Preliminary Draft No. 10, 2014) (“A secondary purpose of victim com-
pensation is to promote offenders’ rehabilitation and reintegration into the 
law-abiding community through the making of amends to crime victims.”). The 
Supreme Court has recognized rehabilitation among the purposes of criminal 
restitution provisions. See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 n.10 (1986) (not-
ing that restitution is “an effective rehabilitative penalty”). In his article in 
this issue of the Minnesota Law Review, Professor Ruback discusses studies 
finding that, under the right circumstances, paying restitution can be associ-
ated with lower recidivism rates. However, he also notes the limited empirical 
value of these studies due to small sample sizes, omitted variable bias, and the 
possibility of reverse causality. R. Barry Ruback, The Benefits and Costs of 
Economic Sanctions: Considering the Victim, the Offender, and Society, 99 
MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1812 (2015). 
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and these do not include many of the violent, sexual, and im-
pulsive crimes the public is most concerned about. And the be-
havior-changing satisfaction of making restitution can occur 
only among offenders who are able to make such payments and 
are emotionally receptive to the idea that payment is a self-
healing act—ultimately a small subset of the total. The poten-
tial of financial obligations to act as positive stressors must be 
viewed in light of their counteracting and deleterious effects, 
which are surveyed in the next several paragraphs. 
Economic penalties have rehabilitation-defeating propensi-
ties. One of the most famous statements of the President’s 
Crime Commission in 1967 was that “[w]arring on poverty . . . 
is warring on crime.”
26
 In the intervening fifty years, there has 
been much study and debate of the poverty-crime connection.
27
 
Yet there are few who would say that the exacerbation of pov-
erty is sensible crime-control policy. The new MPC rests on the 
belief that pushing ex-offenders more deeply into poverty is 
criminogenic—and that, in doing so, we are “warring on reinte-
gration” rather than warring on crime. 
I should disclose that there is little hard data to prove that 
worsening poverty produces more crime than it prevents. There 
are no experimental studies of matched groups of offenders 
with higher and lower criminal justice debt burdens to see how 
their recidivism rates compare. Instead, there is much inferen-
tial evidence that burdensome economic sanctions are at odds 
with the goals of rehabilitation, offender reintegration, crime-
reduction, and public safety. 
Falling behind in payments often leads to further sanctions 
that deepen the hole for offenders, including suspension of 
driver’s licenses, extended periods of community supervision, 
arrest warrants, and sentence revocation. Unrealistic or heavy 
financial obligations interfere with offenders’ abilities to obtain 
credit, pay for transportation (often essential to employment), 
pursue educational opportunities, and sustain family ties.
28
 
 
 26. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, 
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 6 (1967). 
 27. For the most famous criticism of the view that poverty causes crime, 
see JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME, at xiii–xiv, 46–47, 74–75, 202–
203 (1975). For another perspective, see generally WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, 
THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC 
POLICY (1987). 
 28. See Beckett & Harris, supra note 7, at 517–18 (“[L]egal debt itself is 
damaging despite whether payments are made. Like other types of debt, legal 
debt reduces access to housing, credit, and employment; it also limits possibili-
ties for improving one’s educational or occupational situation.”). For a detailed 
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Damaged credit can make it hard to find housing or land a 
job.
29
 Processes for the collection of criminal justice debt can al-
so disrupt employment relationships—as when garnishment of 
wages is used—or may simply reduce the incentives of ex-
offenders to earn in the legitimate economy.
30
 If the effect of fi-
nancial penalties is to reduce a relatively low-wage job to a tiny 
net income, it becomes tempting—and perhaps rational—for an 
offender to look for larger gains in the illegal economy. Also, if 
the burdens of criminal justice debt make it impossible for a 
husband or father to contribute his share to household expens-
es, or even his own living expenses, the sentencing system 
places strain on the bonds of stable family life.
31
 One study con-
cluded that: 
 
summary of the ways in which criminal justice debt, and collection and en-
forcement practices, damage offenders’ chances of successful reintegration, see 
BANNON ET AL., supra note 2, at 24, 27–29 (noting the criminogenic effects of 
suspending driver’s licenses for nonpayment of economic penalties; discussing 
the effect of criminal justice debt on housing and employment prospects, quali-
fication for public benefits, and the ability to pay child support and vote); see 
also REBEKAH DILLER ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, MARYLAND’S 
PAROLE SUPERVISION FEE: A BARRIER TO REENTRY 1 (2009) (finding that eco-
nomic sanctions interfered with offenders’ abilities to secure employment and 
housing); Ruback, supra note 25, at 1811–12 (“The imposition of economic 
sanctions can be burdensome and may make it more difficult for offenders to 
avoid recidivism, particularly when offenders have other expenses (e.g., child 
support, alimony, housing, food, transportation).”); Pleggenkuhle, supra note 
2, at 182–86 (finding that the primary consequences of economic penalties 
were prolonged entanglement in the criminal justice system through extended 
supervision terms and heightened risk of technical violations); cf. David 
Weisburd et al., The Miracle of the Cells: An Experimental Study of Interven-
tions To Increase Payment of Court-Ordered Financial Obligations, 7 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 9, 27 (2008) (finding that the threat of incarcera-
tion was the most effective incentive to persuade delinquent probationers to 
pay economic penalties). 
 29. BANNON ET AL., supra note 2, at 27.  
 30. See Beckett & Harris, supra note 7, at 517–18 (“[B]ecause the wages of 
the convicted (and their spouses) are subject to garnishment, legal debt cre-
ates a disincentive to find work. In our interviews, several interviewees indi-
cated that finding employment was not worth it because their earnings would 
be so diminished by garnishment. Several clerks also reported that employers 
generally dislike hiring those whose wages are garnished because of the cum-
bersome bureaucratic processes this entails.”); Pleggenkuhle, supra note 2, at 
123 (“High risk of garnishment and recognition that a substantial portion of 
the paycheck would go to paying for legal financial obligations acted as a dis-
incentive to obtain employment. This discouragement is problematic, as it di-
minishes the ability to pay legal financial obligations as well as reduces the 
likelihood of experiencing positive effects of employment.”). 
 31. See Pleggenkuhle, supra note 2, at 152 (“[T]he inability to financially 
provide for the family caused negative feelings and essentially challenged [of-
fenders’] masculinity. This inability to be a real ‘family man’ may limit mech-
anisms of cognitive change and limit desistence processes.”). 
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[L]egal financial obligations appear to impede or negatively affect 
mechanisms essential to the desistance process such as personal rela-
tionships, cognitive change towards a non-criminal self, and set up 
additional employment difficulties. Notably, legal financial obliga-
tions contribute to keeping offenders in a perpetual cycle of debt with 
little chance of improving their economic or social circumstances.
32
 
The bulk of social science research indicates that decent 
housing, strong families, and satisfying work are among the 
most important protective factors associated with desistance 
from crime.
33
 Criminal justice policies that block or dilute these 
protective factors would appear to be profoundly misconceived. 
When unrealistic economic penalties are visited on offenders, 
they can inspire feelings of despair or futility, or perceptions of 
courts’ sentences as illegitimate.
34
 None of these are desirable 
outcomes. 
Criminal justice policy must be formulated on the best evi-
dence we have at any given time, and the provisional conclu-
sions that can be drawn from that evidence. On balance, for of-
fenders near or below the poverty line, the MPC views the 
 
 32. Id. at 195. 
 33. Strong work ties and job stability correlate with lower rates of 
reoffending. ROBERT J. SAMPSON & JOHN H. LAUB, CRIME IN THE MAKING: 
PATHWAYS AND TURNING POINTS THROUGH LIFE 140–41, 178 (1993). The ac-
quisition of a “satisfying job,” not just any job, may have an even greater corre-
lation with desistance. See NEAL SHOVER, GREAT PRETENDERS: PURSUITS AND 
CAREERS OF PERSISTENT THIEVES 127 (1996). A recent study found the em-
ployment effect greatest for men over the age of twenty-seven, with no meas-
urable effect for younger participants. Christopher Uggen, Work As a Turning 
Point in the Life Course of Criminals: A Duration Model of Age, Employment, 
and Recidivism, 65 AM. SOC. REV. 529, 529 (2000). On housing, see NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, PAROLE, DESISTANCE FROM CRIME, AND COMMUNITY 
INTEGRATION 54–55 (2007) (“Released prisoners who do not have stable hous-
ing arrangements are more likely to return to prison.”). One widely-cited study 
found that being married was associated with a thirty-five percent reduction 
in risk of reoffending. Robert J. Sampson et al., Does Marriage Reduce Crime? 
A Counterfactual Approach to Within-Individual Causal Effects, 44 
CRIMINOLOGY 465, 465 (2006). Other research has discovered similar but 
smaller effects. See Julie Horney et al., Criminal Careers in the Short-Term: 
Intra-Individual Variability in Crime and Its Relation to Local Life Circum-
stances, 60 AM. SOC. REV. 655, 665 (1995) (finding that, while marriage is as-
sociated with reduced recidivism, cohabitation is associated with an increased 
risk); Alex R. Piquero et al., Race, Local Life Circumstances, and Criminal Ac-
tivity, 83 SOC. SCI. Q. 654, 654 (2002). On the importance of family ties more 
generally, see NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra, at 44 (“Greater contact with 
family during incarceration (by mail, phone, or in-person visits) is associated 
with lower recidivism rates. Prisoners with close family ties have lower recidi-
vism rates than those without such attachments.”). 
 34. A growing body of literature suggests that offenders’ perceptions of 
legitimacy or illegitimacy of the criminal justice system affect their future will-
ingness to comply with the law. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Le-
gitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME & JUSTICE 283, 283 (2003). 
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rehabilitation “scorecard” of financial penalties to be in the 
negative numbers. 
2. General Deterrence 
Classical economic theory would hold that, with every dol-
lar threatened as criminal punishment for a given crime, the 
“cost” of the crime would go up and the incidence of such of-
fending would go down.
35
 In criminology, however, there is no 
credible evidence that marginal increases in punishment sever-
ity can reduce crime rates.
36
 If we are most concerned with seri-
ous crimes, which already are subject to stiff punishments in 
the United States, increases or decreases in severity through 
economic penalties probably make little difference.  
This is not to say that economic sanctions can never be ef-
fective crime deterrents. At the level of misdemeanors and pet-
ty offenses—traffic offenses like speeding come to mind—
economic sanctions may be the only penalties that are threat-
ened, and are sufficient to create some level of deterrent effect. 
For serious economic crimes, perhaps especially white-collar 
crimes, financial penalties could plausibly operate as a general 
deterrent. We are now picturing defendants who plan their 
lives according to financial projections. For serious white-collar 
offenses, however, prison is also threatened, so we would be re-
quired to believe that financial exposure in addition to the risk 
of imprisonment has an incremental deterrent effect. Even 
among white-collar offenders, therefore, the scorecard for the 
deterrence benefits of economic sanctions would be 
inconclusive.  
The use of economic penalties to deter crime within corpo-
rations or other business organizations is a coherent goal. Alt-
hough organizations cannot go to jail, the wellbeing of owners, 
managers, employees, and other constituents requires good fi-
nancial health. There is experience to suggest that the threat of 
devastating monetary penalties can encourage organizations to 
adopt compliance programs for the training and discipline of 
employees. While some in-house compliance systems may be 
run with a wink and a nod, many of them probably do a great 
 
 35. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 
in ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 27–33 (Gary S. 
Becker & William M. Landes eds., 1974), available at http://www.nber.org/ 
chapters/c3625.pdf. 
 36. See Cheryl Marie Webster & Anthony N. Doob, Searching for Sas-
quatch: Deterrence of Crime Through Sentence Severity, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS, supra note 3 at 174–75. 
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deal of good.
37
 
In other circumstances, where serious criminal conduct has 
already occurred within a business organization, the deterrent 
force of economic penalties may cause the business to mount a 
genuine internal investigation, focusing its energies on finding 
the guilty individuals. The struggle for survival may even lead 
a business to repudiate corporate leadership as Drexel Burn-
ham Lambert did when it turned on Michael Milken.
38
 In short, 
a system of financial penalties may be a mainstay of organiza-
tional sentencing—but this is outside the present MPC project, 
which only deals with the sentencing of individuals.
39
 
Returning to the utilitarian scorecard of economic sanc-
tions, if we are talking about individual human beings rather 
than corporate entities, the weight of criminological knowledge 
suggests that the increases in financial punishments that have 
occurred in the past several decades have not themselves pro-
duced much reduction in crime—and future increases in finan-
cial penalties should not be expected to have such an effect ei-
ther.
40
 
 
 37. See, e.g., Stephen Calkins, Corporate Compliance and the Antitrust 
Agencies’ Bi-Modal Penalties, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 144 (1997) 
(“Corporations can design compliance programs and consciously send the sub-
tle, important signals that they take compliance seriously (even making com-
pliance matters part of annual reviews and something factored into compensa-
tion decisions).”); Michael Goldsmith & Chad W. King, Policing Corporate 
Crime: The Dilemma of Internal Compliance Programs, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1, 44 
(1997); Diana E. Murphy, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organiza-
tions: A Decade of Promoting Compliance and Ethics, 87 IOWA L. REV. 697, 
698–99 (2002); Andrew Weissman, A New Approach to Corporate Criminal Li-
ability, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1319, 1322 (2007) (“[C]orporate management will 
be greatly incentivized to protect the corporation from criminal liability by 
creating a strong and effective compliance program.”). But see Marie 
McKendall et al., Ethical Compliance Programs and Corporate Illegality: Test-
ing the Assumptions of the Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, 37 J. BUS. ETHICS 
367, 367 (2002). 
 38. See William S. Laufer, Corporate Prosecution, Cooperation, and the 
Trading of Favors, 87 IOWA L. REV. 643, 652 (2002) (“Corporate and retained 
counsel have a distinct incentive to align themselves with prosecutors by open-
ing internal investigative files and, most disturbingly, turning culpable em-
ployees over to the government (a practice known as ‘flipping’) in deals orches-
trated to win favor.”). For the Michael Milken story, see JAMES B. STEWART, 
DEN OF THIEVES (1991). 
 39. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.02 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 
2014). 
 40. I am unaware of any scholar who has argued that increases in the use 
and amounts of financial sanctions over the past several decades contributed 
to the national “crime drop” that began in the early 1990s. 
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3. Incapacitation 
In most cases, economic sanctions have no incapacitation 
value. Impecunity is more likely to be criminogenic than crime-
precluding. 
In some settings, however, economic penalties can be a 
form of incapacitation, when capital investment or cash-on-
hand is necessary for the criminal behavior at issue. Large 
sums of money may be required for a functioning criminal en-
terprise or an otherwise legitimate business that is operated in 
a criminal manner. Bernie Madoff needed good suits, expensive 
jewelry, and a nicely-decorated office to convince people to in-
vest money with him.
41
 A drug kingpin must have funds for the 
purchase of inventory and payment of workers. Most bid-
rigging offenses would be pointless without a business to cash 
in on an ill-won contract. Forfeiture of assets and instrumental-
ities of crime can play a legitimate disabling role in such cas-
es.
42
 
Unfortunately, most criminals do not have much overhead, 
and most criminal careers begin with little money, so the 
incapacitative value of economic sanctions for most crimes is 
negligible. 
C. REVENUE GENERATION 
An additional sometimes-stated purpose of economic sanc-
tions is revenue generation, most often in the context of asset 
forfeiture and costs, fees, and assessments. Law enforcement 
and corrections officials candidly—sometimes proudly—admit 
that user fees or assets collected from suspects or convicted of-
fenders are important sources of revenue. It is not uncommon 
to hear that major shares of agencies’ operating budgets are 
funded by offenders’ payments.
43
 Here we are not talking about 
 
 41. See generally DIANA B. HENRIQUES, THE WIZARD OF LIES: BERNIE 
MADOFF AND THE DEATH OF TRUST (2012); Bernie Madoff’s Life of Luxury, 
ABC NEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/photos/bernie-madoffs-life-luxury 
-11929194/image-11929310 (last visited Apr. 3, 2015) (showing pictures of 
some of Bernie Madoff’s expensive belongings). 
 42. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04C(2) (Tentative Draft No. 
3, 2014) (one purpose of asset forfeiture is “to incapacitate offenders from crim-
inal conduct that requires the forfeited assets for its commission”). 
 43. See DALE PARENT, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, RECOVERING 
CORRECTIONAL COSTS THROUGH OFFENDER FEES 5 (1990) (“Among all proba-
tion and parole agencies responding [across seventeen states], fee receipts av-
eraged 23.6 percent of their total operating budgets.”); CARL REYNOLDS ET AL., 
COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR., A FRAMEWORK TO IMPROVE HOW 
FINES, FEES, RESTITUTION, AND CHILD SUPPORT ARE ASSESSED AND 
COLLECTED FROM PEOPLE CONVICTED OF CRIMES: INTERIM REPORT 1 (2009), 
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traditional criminal justice purposes, but goals like making 
payroll, purchasing equipment otherwise not budgeted for, or 
contributing to general funds unrelated to criminal justice.
44
 On 
principle, the MPC regards revenue generation as an illegiti-
mate purpose of the sentencing process.
45
 
While criminal offenders are attractive targets for special 
taxation because of their culpable acts and political unpopulari-
ty, they usually lack the means to make outsized contributions 
to government programming when compared to ordinary tax-
payers.
46
 A working justice system and corrections system is the 
 
available at http://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/2009-CSG 
-TXOCA-report.pdf (“[I]n 2006 probation fees made up 46 percent of the Travis 
County (Texas) Community Supervision and Corrections Department’s $18.3 
million budget.”); Paul Peterson, Supervision Fees: State Policies and Practice, 
76 FED. PROBATION 40, 42 (2012) (“[I]n 2008 Jefferson County, Texas . . . re-
ported collecting the equivalent of half of their budget from fees (over 3.6 mil-
lion dollars)”; also noting that probation officers’ records of fee collection were 
heavily weighted in their performance evaluations); see also David E. Olson & 
Gerard F. Ramker, Crime Does Not Pay, but Criminals May: Factors Influenc-
ing the Imposition and Collection of Probation Fees, 22 JUST. SYS. J. 29, 30 
(2001); Joan Petersilia, Probation in the United States, 22 CRIME & JUST. 149, 
171–73 (1997). 
 44. See BANNON ET AL., supra note 2, at 30 (reporting that in a study of 
fifteen states, at least eleven of the states “use some criminal fees, fines, or 
penalties to support general revenue funds, treasuries, or funds unrelated to 
the administration of criminal law—effectively turning courts, clerks, and 
probation officers into general tax collectors”). 
 45. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04 cmt. b (Tentative Draft 
No. 3, 2014); id. § 6.04C(2). 
 46. Id. § 6.04 cmt. b. On the poverty of most defendants, see BRENNAN 
CTR. FOR JUSTICE, ELIGIBLE FOR JUSTICE: GUIDELINES FOR APPOINTING 
DEFENSE COUNSEL 4 (2008), available at http://www.brennancenter 
.org/sites/default/files/legacy/publications/Eligibility.Report.pdf (stating that 
most criminal defendants qualify as indigent for purposes of appointment of 
counsel); PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, COLLATERAL COSTS: INCARCERATION’S 
EFFECT ON ECONOMIC MOBILITY (2010), available at http://www.pewtrusts 
.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2010/ 
CollateralCosts1pdf.pdf; cf. BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY 
IN AMERICA 108–30 (2006) (concluding that incarceration deepens poverty by 
reducing future employment prospects and earnings). Typical offenders’ eco-
nomic circumstances are painted in detail by Alicia Bannon, Mitali Nagrecha, 
and Rebekah Diller: 
  Fees and other criminal justice debt are typically levied on a pop-
ulation uniquely unable to make payments. Criminal defendants are 
overwhelmingly poor. It is estimated that 80–90 percent of those 
charged with criminal offenses qualify for indigent defense. Nearly 65 
percent of those incarcerated in the U.S. did not receive a high school 
diploma; 70 percent of prisoners function at the lowest literacy levels. 
African-Americans face a particularly severe burden: Nationally, Af-
rican-Americans comprise 13 percent of the population but 28 percent 
of those arrested and 40 percent of those incarcerated, and African-
Americans are almost five times more likely than white defendants to 
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responsibility of all citizens, and should be funded according-
ly.
47
 
If revenue generation were treated as a desirable goal of 
the sentencing system, we could ask further whether the mon-
ey gained through economic sanctioning is greater than the ex-
penses of its collection—plus the cost of enforcement when 
payments are not made. In many instances, this would be a dif-
ficult call. It is sometimes reported that systems for collection 
of fines or restitution barely break even.
48
 Dysfunctional ar-
rangements exist in which the entity collecting the money from 
offenders does not bear the full cost of enforcement—as when 
counties or private providers benefit from user fees, but the 
state pays the cost of sentence revocations for nonpayment.
49
 If 
one concludes that revenue generation is not an affirmative 
justification of economic penalties as criminal sentences, how-
ever, such an assessment of net profitability is unnecessary. 
II.  HIGHLIGHTS OF THE CODE’S RECOMMENDATIONS   
A. PRESERVING A FLOOR OF REASONABLE FINANCIAL 
SUBSISTENCE 
The single most important economic sanctions provision in 
the Model Penal Code (Second) states that “[n]o economic sanc-
tion . . . may be imposed unless the offender would retain suffi-
 
rely on indigent defense counsel. 
  Individuals emerging from prison often face significant challenges 
meeting basic needs. Many are unable to find stable housing—it is es-
timated that 15 to 27 percent of prisoners expect to go to homeless 
shelters upon their release. Many used drugs or alcohol regularly be-
fore going to prison and may need treatment upon release. 
  Employment rates for those coming out of prison are also notori-
ously low—up to 60 percent of former inmates are unemployed one 
year after release. Obstacles to finding a job are even greater now, as 
the unemployment rate in the general population hovers at just under 
10 percent, and is as high as 16 percent for industries such as con-
struction that have traditionally been sources of jobs for persons with 
criminal convictions. 
BANNON ET AL., supra note 2, at 4. 
 47. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 
3, 2014). See Beckett & Harris, supra note 7, at 511 (arguing that the fiscal 
cost associated with criminal penalties “is an important check on government 
power”); Logan & Wright, supra note 2, at 1178 (“[R]equiring offenders to in-
ternalize the costs associated with their wrongdoing . . . weakens one of the 
key moderating influences in public safety politics.”). 
 48. See Beckett & Harris, supra note 7, at 527–28 (cautioning that sys-
tems for collection of correctional fees and fines do not necessarily realize a net 
financial gain). 
 49. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2. 
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cient means for reasonable living expenses and family obliga-
tions after compliance with the sanction.”
50
 The MPC advocates 
a new concept of “reasonable financial subsistence” (RFS) that 
limits governments’ abilities to impose and collect financial tar-
iffs.
51
 This is an across-the-board prohibition that applies to all 
economic sanctions, including victim restitution.
52
  
The RFS principle is required not because criminals de-
serve society’s munificence, but because it is believed to be a 
route to increased public safety. As discussed in Part I, the best 
available evidence suggests that economic sanctions have nega-
tive effects on offender rehabilitation and reintegration when 
they disrupt the fundamentals of stable work, housing, and 
family life—or provide incentives to seek earnings in the illegal 
economy.
53
 Much like bankruptcy law, a primary goal of the 
sentencing system should be to reposition ex-offenders so they 
may become productive and successful participants in the law-
abiding economy.
54
 
The Code’s RFS principle calls for significant changes in 
the laws of all American jurisdictions. While federal constitu-
tional law in theory cuts off the collectability of economic sanc-
tions with reference to offenders’ “ability to pay” under Bearden 
v. Georgia,
55
 this sets too low a floor for public-policy purposes.
56
 
 
 50. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04(6) (Tentative Draft No. 3, 
2014). Subsection (7) of the same provision goes on to say that “[i]f the court 
refrains from imposing an economic sanction because of the limitation in sub-
section (6), the court may not substitute a prison sanction for the unavailable 
economic sanction.” Id. § 6.04(7).  
 51. Id. § 6.04 cmt. b (introducing the terminology and explaining that 
“economic sanctions are not viable for indigent or near-indigent offenders, and 
should not be imposed when they would choke off an offender’s ability to pro-
vide reasonable necessities of life for himself and his dependents”). 
 52. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04A cmt. c (Tentative Draft 
No. 3, 2014). 
 53. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 54. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2)(a)(ii) (Tentative Draft 
No. 1, 2007) (stating that one general purpose of the sentencing system is the 
“reintegration of offenders into the law-abiding community”). 
 55. The Supreme Court stated in Bearden: 
  [I]n revocation proceedings for failure to pay a fine or restitution, 
a sentencing court must inquire into the reasons for the failure to 
pay. If the probationer willfully refused to pay or failed to make suffi-
cient bona fide efforts legally to acquire the resources to pay, the 
court may revoke probation and sentence the defendant to imprison-
ment within the authorized range of its sentencing authority. If the 
probationer could not pay despite sufficient bona fide efforts to ac-
quire the resources to do so, the court must consider alternative 
measures of punishment other than imprisonment. Only if alternative 
measures are not adequate to meet the State’s interests in punish-
ment and deterrence may the court imprison a probationer who has 
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The RFS standard differs from Bearden in both its underpin-
nings and implementation. RFS is based on grounds of public 
policy, not minimum requirements of Due Process. It is intend-
ed to further offenders’ chances to achieve financial stability 
and independence—a consideration that plays no role in consti-
tutional analysis. There will be many instances in which an 
economic sanction cannot permissibly be imposed under sub-
section (6) even though the offender has the raw “ability to pay” 
the sanction, if doing so would leave the offender unable to 
meet the reasonable and minimal expenses of his own life and 
those of his dependents. Also, because constitutional ability-to-
pay considerations usually do not arise until enforcement pro-
ceedings,
57
 they do not act as a brake on the imposition of ex-
 
made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay. . . .  
. . . . 
. . . By sentencing petitioner to imprisonment simply because he could 
not pay the fine, without considering the reasons for the inability to 
pay or the propriety of reducing the fine or extending the time for 
payments or making alternative orders, the court automatically 
turned a fine into a prison sentence. 
Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672, 674 (1983). 
 56. By many accounts, the Bearden principle has not been applied consci-
entiously by the courts. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 2, at 5 
(“Today, courts across the United States routinely disregard the protections 
and principles the Supreme Court established in Bearden v. Georgia over 
twenty years ago. . . . [D]ay after day, indigent defendants are imprisoned for 
failing to pay legal debts they can never hope to manage. In many cases, poor 
men and women end up jailed or threatened with jail though they have no 
lawyer representing them.”); BANNON ET AL., supra note 2, at 20 (“[Despite] 
constitutional protections, Brennan Center interviews with defenders and 
court personnel revealed that some jurisdictions ignore the requirement that 
courts inquire into ability to pay before utilizing debtors’ prison, while many 
others skirt the edges of the law by failing to evaluate a defendant’s ability to 
pay until after he or she has been arrested, or even jailed, for criminal justice 
debt, or by allowing defendants to ‘volunteer’ to be incarcerated.”); Beckett & 
Harris, supra note 7, at 524–25 (“[L]egal debtors continue to be arrested and 
incarcerated as a result of nonpayment with some regularity. Authorities have 
circumvented the constraint proffered in Bearden v. Georgia (1983) in several 
ways. . . . [I]t seems that ‘willful’ is a highly elastic concept, one that fails to 
create a meaningful barrier to the incarceration of indigent debtors. For ex-
ample, one community corrections officer told us that in his view, ‘all nonpay-
ment is willful’ because felons ‘can always go out and get a day job.’ Judges 
sometimes accept this reasoning. . . . In some jurisdictions, debtors are pre-
sented with the ‘option’ of paying off their debt by going to jail. In Washington 
State, this is called the ‘pay or stay’ option and is authorized by state stat-
ute.”); Mary Fainsod Katzenstein & Mitali Nagrecha, A New Punishment Re-
gime, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 555, 565 (2011) (“[E]ven the strongly ar-
ticulated ‘ability-to-pay’ ruling developed in the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Bearden v. Georgia (1983) has been substantially diluted.”). 
 57. In most jurisdictions, judges are not required to assess offenders’ abil-
ity to pay before imposing economic sanctions. Instead, the consideration 
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cessively severe economic sanctions in the first instance—and 
the damage to an offender’s rehabilitative prospects may be 
done far in advance of a formal violations hearing.
58
 Under the 
Code’s scheme, RFS must be adjudicated at the sentencing 
hearing itself. 
The RFS provision supplements other limits on sentence 
severity in the MPC. The Code states separately that penalties 
may never be unjustly disproportionate. This is a statutory 
“subconstitutional” proportionality ceiling intended to regulate 
sentence severity more closely than the Supreme Court’s cur-
rent Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
59
 In contemporary 
America, economic sanctions—alone or in combination—have 
been known to cross this line with regularity.
60
  
Proportionality is an aggregate and gestalt concept in the 
MPC. When judging the economic effects of a criminal sen-
tence, courts are directed to consider all the ways in which an 
 
comes up in the enforcement setting, and only when the enforcement authority 
(typically a judge or parole board) contemplates the use of imprisonment as a 
sanction for nonpayment. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 2, at 31; 
BANNON ET AL., supra note 2, at 13, 20; R. Barry Ruback & Mark H. Berg-
strom, Economic Sanctions in Criminal Justice: Purposes, Effects, and Impli-
cations, 33 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 242, 260 (2006) (“When they impose fines, 
judges in many states’ systems rarely have information about the offender’s 
ability to pay.”). 
 58. The Brennan Center advocates for ability-to-pay determinations at 
sentencing, not in later proceedings. See BANNON ET AL., supra note 2, at 
(“Such determinations are necessary because once individuals are sentenced to 
pay criminal justice debt, they are immediately at risk of sanctions for non-
payment such as probation revocation and the loss of driving privileges, as 
well as other harms such as damaged credit and a loss of public benefits.”); see 
also AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 2, at 79 (“Judges should be re-
quired to determine defendants’ ability to pay at sentencing based on enumer-
ated factors, including the defendants’ employment history and status, their 
financial situation at the time of sentencing, and their realistic prospects of 
being able to pay their legal debt.”). 
 59. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 7.09(5)(b) (Preliminary Draft 
No. 10, 2014) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of the Code, the appellate 
courts may reverse or modify any sentence, including a sentence imposed un-
der a mandatory penalty provision, on the ground that it is not proportionate 
to the gravity of the offense, the harms done to the crime victim, and the 
blameworthiness of the offender. The appellate court shall use its independent 
judgment when applying this provision.”); id. § 7.09(5)(b) cmt. f (“The [ALI] 
recommends creation of a subconstitutional power of proportionality review to 
reach miscarriages of penalty that would survive scrutiny under the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause.”). 
 60. One of the MPC’s fundamental purposes of sentencing is “to render 
sentences in all cases within a range of severity proportionate to the gravity of 
offenses, the harms done to crime victims, and the blameworthiness of offend-
ers.” MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2)(a)(i) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 
2007). 
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offender’s economic standing has been affected by the legal sys-
tem. In addition to direct monetary tariffs, numerous collateral 
consequences of conviction limit offenders’ future employment 
prospects—and in some cases these add up to serious disad-
vantages. The Code states that, “[i]n evaluating the total [pro-
portionality] of punishment . . . the court should consider the 
effects of collateral sanctions likely to be applied to the offender 
under state and federal law, to the extent these can reasonably 
be determined.”
61
 
There is a serious administrative difficulty with the Code’s 
RFS recommendation. It is doubtful that busy and under-
resourced courts can make effective inquiries into an offender’s 
assets and income in every case—especially in rapid-fire mis-
demeanor proceedings that begin and end in several minutes. A 
process of meaningful investigation, if one could be designed, 
might not be worth its costs. It is fair to ask whether there are 
workable solutions in sight.
62
  
One approach would be to presume that offenders do not 
meet the financial threshold unless the government can prove 
otherwise. Available data suggest that eighty to ninety percent 
of criminal offenders in some jurisdictions qualify as indigent 
for purposes of the appointment of counsel.
63
 A presumption of 
poverty is strongest for African American defendants, who by 
one estimate make use of appointed counsel nearly five times 
 
 61. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.02(4) (Tentative Draft No. 3, 
2014). 
 62. See Jessica M. Eaglin, Improving Economic Sanctions in the States, 99 
MINN. L. REV. 1837, 1839 (2015) (noting that, although the revised MPC 
“takes pivotal steps to improve economic sanctions,” it “avoids tackling one of 
the key problems with economic sanctions in the states: defining ability-to-pay 
determinations”). The MPC’s official Comment makes one suggestion on this 
score: 
  Some jurisdictions may choose to adopt particularized rules to 
help implement the broad principal stated in subsection (6). One pro-
vision of this kind was considered when drafting the revised Code. 
Although too specific to be included in § 6.04, the following language 
would be consistent with the spirit of subsection (6): 
No economic sanction may be imposed on an indigent 
offender as defined by the state’s eligibility rules for ap-
pointment of counsel in a criminal case. Qualification for or 
receipt of any of the following public benefits shall serve as 
evidence that the offender would not retain sufficient 
means for reasonable living expenses and family obliga-
tions after compliance with one or more economic sanc-
tions. 
MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04 cmt. h (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2014). 
 63. See BANNON ET AL., supra note 2, at 4. 
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as often as white defendants.
64
 Generally, future earning power 
among those with criminal convictions is extremely low.
65
 
Offenders tend to come from disadvantaged neighborhoods, 
where they return after contact with the criminal justice sys-
tem.
66
 Among people released from incarceration, studies sug-
gest that the average offender’s earnings are below the poverty 
line for a single individual and well below the poverty line for a 
small family.
67
 
An alternative approach would be to rely on offenders’ 
sworn testimony concerning their assets and income in the ab-
sence of other evidence. There will be understandable skepti-
cism about the reliability of such testimony—despite the fact 
that defendants expose themselves to prosecution for perjury if 
they testify falsely. Offenders’ testimony may still be the best 
evidence readily at hand. Many will not perjure themselves, ei-
ther because they do not have to (i.e., they really qualify for the 
RFS bar) or because they feel a moral and legal obligation to 
tell the truth. We cannot assume that everyone will lie at an 
economic sanctions hearing just as we should not assume that 
most police officers “testilie” at suppression hearings.
68
 None-
theless, a substantial number of errors will slip through when 
 
 64. See id.  
 65. See WESTERN, supra note 46, at 108–30 (describing how incarceration 
deepens poverty by reducing future employment prospects and earnings). 
 66. See generally TODD R. CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: HOW MASS 
INCARCERATION MAKES DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE (2007) (de-
tailing the effects of mass incarceration on poor communities); ROBERT J. 
SAMPSON, GREAT AMERICAN CITY: CHICAGO AND THE ENDURING 
NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECT (2012) (exploring neighborhood inequality and the 
enduring importance of place and community in relation to social phenomena 
such as crime); W. J. WILSON, supra note 27 (examining urban poverty in the 
United States and suggesting a comprehensive way to address it). 
 67. A recent study estimated that formerly incarcerated white men had 
an average yearly income of $11,140 and black men $8,012. Harris et al., su-
pra note 2, at 1776 tbl.7. A national study of self-report data from 2004 found 
that, after incarceration, the average white offender had annual earnings of 
only $9,760, with the average black offender earning only $7,020. WESTERN, 
supra note 46, at 116 tbl.5.2. For 2014, federal guidelines placed the poverty 
line for a single individual at an income of $11,670 per year. For a family of 
two the poverty line was $15,730; for a family of three it was $19,790. 2014 
Poverty Guidelines, 79 Fed. Reg. 3593, 3593 (Jan. 22, 2014); see also Corbett, 
supra note 8, at 1720–21 (collecting financial data from a state in the 
northeastern United States showing that “at the time of arraignment across 
three of the busier jurisdictions, 63% of the defendants had been determined 
to be indigent. In terms of employment across the state as a whole, of those 
placed under active supervision, 48% were unemployed at the time or arrest 
and 55% reported that they were currently experiencing financial problems.”). 
 68. See Kevin R. Reitz, Testilying As a Problem of Crime Control: A Reply 
to Professor Slobogin, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1061, 1062–64 (1996). 
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perjury goes undetected. In cases where the government 
strongly suspects it is being bamboozled, it is not completely 
helpless—although an investment of time and effort would be 
required to meet its burden of persuasion that the defendant is 
lying.  
At the end of the day, solutions like these may be the “least 
worst” of available options. Given what we know of offenders’ 
financial standing in general, the playing field would at least 
be tilted in the direction of reality. The “worst worst” scenario, 
on the other hand, may be exactly what we have today, when 
many courts sanction offenders for nonpayment of financial 
penalties without credible inquiry into their ability to pay.
69
 
We should not be too hard on the MPC for failing to solve 
the fact-finding conundrum of defendants’ true financial 
means. Nor should the RFS proposal be set aside because of its 
necessary crudeness of implementation. The administrative dif-
ficulty of determining offenders’ financial status is not a weak-
ness unique to the Code’s RFS proposal. Some such inquiry is 
mandated by constitutional law in any system of economic pen-
alties where incarceration is used as a backup sanction. 
Bearden v. Georgia is itself an unadministrable constitutional 
command—or one incapable of reasonable precision—just as we 
find RFS to be. In application, Bearden’s ability-to-pay stand-
ard has proven a weak instrument, and is frequently disre-
garded under a veil of ignorance and generalized suspicions 
that offenders have assets they are concealing from the author-
ities or private collectors.  
Poor information is the elephant in the room in any regime 
of financial penalties. No one has yet found a successful answer 
to the problem; and yet we must aspire to the most satisfactory 
system we can design. 
B. ABOLITION OF COSTS, FEES, AND ASSESSMENTS 
While the RFS provision speaks to economic sanctions 
across the board, the Model Penal Code (Second) contains a 
number of important recommendations that apply to specific 
types of financial penalties. Most significantly, it recommends 
two alternative provisions on the subject of costs, fees, and as-
sessments, defined as follows: “Costs, fees, and assessments . . . 
include financial obligations imposed by law-enforcement agen-
cies, public-defender agencies, courts, corrections departments, 
and corrections providers to defray expenses associated with 
 
 69. See supra notes 55–58 and accompanying text. 
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the investigation and prosecution of the offender or correctional 
services provided to the offender.”
70
 
In its first alternative provision on costs, fees, and assess-
ments, the MPC states categorically that “[n]o convicted of-
fender . . . shall be held responsible for the payment of costs, 
fees, and assessments.”
71
 This policy is the clear first preference 
of the ALI. In a second alternative provision, the Code would 
reluctantly tolerate the existence of costs, fees, and assess-
ments, subject to a host of substantive and procedural limita-
tions.
72
 
User fees and related costs and surcharges have grown 
enormously in numbers, varieties, and amounts since the time 
of the original Code, and they continue to proliferate.
73
 They are 
often assessed at different levels of government within a state,
74
 
and no state maintains adequate jurisdiction-wide records of 
their use.
75
 There is evidence that these assessments are im-
posed with little uniformity,
76
 and with no thought given to 
their effects on proportionality of sentences or the offenders’ ef-
forts to rebuild a life in the free community. Other countries do 
 
 70. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04D(2), Alternative § 6.04D(1) 
(Tentative Draft No. 3, 2014). 
 71. Id. § 6.04D(1) (ban on costs, fees, and assessments also extending to 
deferred prosecutions and adjudications). Professor Ruback, writing for this 
issue of the Minnesota Law Review, reaches the same conclusion as the new 
MPC. See Ruback, supra note 25, at 1782 (“Costs and fees are the least defen-
sible sanction, and I argue that they should be prohibited.”). 
 72. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04D(2), Alternative § 6.04D(2)–
(4) (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2014).  
 73. See supra note 7. 
 74. A study of economic sanctions imposed on convicted felony and mis-
demeanor offenders in Pennsylvania during 2006–2007 found a staggering to-
tal of 2,629 different types of economic sanctions in use across the state, at dif-
ferent levels of government. Ruback & Clark, supra note 2, at 761; see also 
Beckett & Harris, supra note 7, at 514 (observing that the assessment of fines 
and fees can vary enormously from county to county within the same state). 
 75. States maintain little data on the assessment and collection of costs 
and fees, and are often reluctant to make the information they have publicly 
available. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 2, at 9, 11 (recommend-
ing that “[a]ll jurisdictions should collect and publish data regarding the as-
sessment and collection of LFOs [legal financial obligations], the costs of col-
lections (including the cost of incarceration), and how collected funds are 
distributed, broken down by race, type of crime, geographical location, and 
type of court”). 
 76. One study reported that the total amount of fines and fees does not 
bear recognizable relationship to the seriousness of offenders’ crimes. For ex-
ample, drug offenders—especially Latino drug offenders—were assessed 
greater monetary sanctions than violent offenders. Alexes Harris et al., Cour-
tesy Stigma and Monetary Sanctions: Toward a Socio-Cultural Theory of Pun-
ishment, 76 AM. SOC. REV. 234, 253–54 (2011). 
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not appear to tax offenders with criminal justice costs and fees 
to the same extent as the United States.
77
 
The MPC may have been mistaken to include alternative 
provisions on this subject rather than a single, forceful mes-
sage—but there was a rationale for doing so. Alternative rec-
ommendations find their way into the MPC for many reasons. 
Sometimes the Code sees two approaches as equally meritori-
ous and recommends that a state follow either fork in the road, 
whichever best fits local needs.
78
 In other instances, the Code 
offers alternative provisions while stating a strong preference 
for one over the other.
79
 The most important example of this is 
the MPC’s stance on mandatory minimum sentences. The ALI’s 
primary position is that state legislatures should enact no 
mandatory criminal sentences and should repeal all that have 
been enacted.
80
 Some people argue that the ALI should stop 
there and speak no further on the subject. Part of their argu-
ment is that the Code may appear to be conceding the validity 
of mandatory sentences if it acknowledges their existence.  
There is another viewpoint, however, that it would be irre-
sponsible to stand on principle and ignore the mandatory pun-
ishment laws that have been enacted in every American juris-
diction; if there are useful policy suggestions that fall short of 
total abolition, an influential organization like the ALI should 
be creating and promoting them. In the new MPC, the latter 
perspective prevailed.
81
 Thus, the Code includes numerous pro-
 
 77. On the rarity of the use of criminal justice costs and fees outside the 
United States, see O’Malley, supra note 19, at 547–48 (“Fees . . . are much less 
prominent outside the United States, almost never being levied for imprison-
ment and only in recent years being levied in some jurisdictions for victim 
compensation and costs of fine enforcement.”). 
 78. For example, the MPC includes two recommended provisions on the 
composition of a sentencing commission. See MODEL PENAL CODE: 
SENTENCING § 6A.02, Alternative § 6A.02 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007) (alter-
native plans for “Membership of Sentencing Commission”); id. § 6A.02, Alter-
native § 6A.02 cmt. a (“The alternative provisions here supply workable illus-
trations for state legislators. Individual jurisdictions are encouraged to adapt 
these templates to fit their own circumstances.”).  
 79. For example, the new MPC recommends that every state adopt a sys-
tem of presumptive sentencing guidelines, but includes backup recommenda-
tions in favor of the promulgation of advisory guidelines as a second-best sen-
tencing structure. See id. § 1.02(2) cmt. p. 
 80. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.06(3) (Tentative Draft No. 
2, 2011) (“The [sentencing] court is not required to impose a minimum term of 
imprisonment for any offense under this Code. This provision supersedes any 
contrary provision in the Code.”); id. § 6.06(3) cmt. a (“In jurisdictions that 
have enacted mandatory penalties, subsection (3) makes clear that the intent 
of the legislature is to supersede all such preexisting laws.”).  
 81. See id. § 6.06 cmt. d (“Taking the world of American criminal justice 
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visions that soften the impact of mandatory sentencing laws 
wherever they exist.
82
 These fall-back mechanisms are not 
meant to subtract from the ALI’s general prohibitory stance—
although there is a risk they will be seen that way. Instead, 
they are second-order recommendations and concessions to re-
ality—resting on the familiar bromide that the perfect should 
not be the enemy of the good. 
Similarly with respect to costs, fees, and assessments, the 
Code takes a categorical abolitionist position, but recognizes 
that most state and local governments will not instantly adhere 
to this pronouncement. The prospects of mass abrogation of 
revenue-raising user fees and other surcharges are probably 
about the same as for a nationwide repeal of mandatory penal-
ties.
83
 Realistically, in the short- or middle-term, the best-case 
 
as it is, and as it is likely to remain for some time, the [ALI] concluded that it 
would be irresponsible to rest upon a categorical policy of condemnation of 
mandatory sentences, without also offering second-order recommendations for 
significant incremental change.”). 
 82. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 7.XX(3)(b) (Tentative Draft 
No. 1, 2007) (giving sentencing judges a “departure” power to deviate from the 
terms of mandatory-penalty provisions); id. § 6B.03(6) (prohibiting sentencing 
commissions from formulating guidelines based on the severity levels of man-
datory-punishment statutes); MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09(3) 
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011) (authorizing judges to deviate from a mandatory-
minimum sentence when an offender otherwise subject to the mandatory pen-
alty is identified through actuarial risk assessment to pose an unusually low 
risk of recidivism); id. § 6.11A(f) (providing that, under a new provision for the 
sentencing of offenders under the age of eighteen at the time of their offenses, 
judges are not bound by otherwise applicable mandatory sentences); id. 
§ 305.1(3) (providing that good-time credits are always to be subtracted from 
the minimum term of a mandated prison sentence); id. § 305.6(1), (5) (showing 
a new sentence-modification power (the so-called “second-look provision”), 
which engages after a prisoner has served fifteen years, expressly supersedes 
any mandatory-minimum penalty); id. § 305.7(8) (providing that compassion-
ate release provision for aged and infirm inmates, or for extraordinary and 
compelling circumstances, expressly supersedes any mandatory-minimum 
penalty); MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6x.01(3) (Tentative Draft No. 3, 
2014) (granting sentencing courts the power to relieve mandatory effect of cer-
tain collateral consequences of conviction, rendering their application discre-
tionary); MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.02B(3) (Preliminary Draft No. 
10, 2014) (giving trial courts authority to “defer adjudication for an offense 
that carries a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment if the court finds 
that the mandatory penalty would not best serve the purposes of sentencing”); 
id. § 6.04A(1) (providing that imposition of victim restitution order should not 
be mandatory, but should be discretionary with the sentencing court); id. 
§ 7.09(5)(b) (granting appellate courts authority to reverse or modify a manda-
tory penalty if it “is not proportionate to the gravity of the offense, the harms 
done to the crime victim, and the blameworthiness of the offender”). 
 83. See Burch, supra note 2, at 539 (“[T]he few studies that are available 
suggest that the public overwhelmingly supports the notion that offenders, 
particularly prisoners, should help pay for the cost of their punishment.”). 
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scenario is that a small number of jurisdictions will follow the 
MPC approach, but most will not.
84
 The Code therefore offers a 
series of second-best recommendations addressed to states that 
do not implement a blanket prohibition. As with mandatory 
minimums, the ALI concluded it would be irresponsible to say 
nothing about a serious problem that will almost certainly per-
sist in most jurisdictions for years to come. In the long run, 
every incremental step toward reducing criminal justice sys-
tems’ reliance on costs, fees, and assessments makes their 
eventual abolition more practicable. 
The Code’s preferred position—that costs, fees, and as-
sessments should be abolished—rests chiefly on the premise 
that such financial encumbrances do not serve the goals of the 
sentencing system, but are imposed for the side purpose of rev-
enue generation. The self-interest of courts, correctional agen-
cies, and service providers is at the forefront; other public goals 
are ignored or sacrificed. This creates serious conflicts of inter-
est that should not be tolerated in a system that aspires to the 
even-handed administration of criminal law.
85
  
 
 84. For example, New York state currently allows for probation supervi-
sion fees only in drunk driving cases. The New York Attorney General has is-
sued an opinion stating that, in the absence of legislative authorization, other 
types of correctional fees may not be imposed by local jurisdictions. See N.Y. 
EXEC. LAW § 257-c(1), (4) (2014); Informal Op. N.Y. Att’y Gen. No. 2003-4 
(2003), available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/opinion/I%202003 
-4%20pw.pdf; KELLY LYN MITCHELL ET AL., ROBINA INSTIT. OF CRIMINAL LAW 
& CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROFILES IN PROBATION REVOCATION: EXAMINING THE 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN 21 STATES, at 59 (2014), available at http://www 
.robinainstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/Robina-Report-2015-WEB.pdf. 
 85. On the problem of conflicts of interest surrounding criminal justice 
costs and fees, see BANNON ET AL., supra note 2, at 2 (“Overdependence on fee 
revenue compromises the traditional functions of courts and correctional agen-
cies. When courts are pressured to act, in essence, as collection arms of the 
state, their traditional independence suffers. When probation and parole offic-
ers must devote time to fee collection instead of public safety and rehabilita-
tion, they too compromise their roles.”). Evidence that conflict-of-interest prob-
lems worsened during the Great Recession is reported in AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES 
UNION, supra note 2, at 8 (“Imprisoning those who fail to pay fines and court 
costs is a relatively recent and growing phenomenon: States and counties, 
hard-pressed to find revenue to shore up failing budgets, see a ready source of 
funds in defendants who can be assessed LFOs [legal financial obligations] 
that must be repaid on pain of imprisonment, and have grown more aggressive 
in their collection efforts. Courts nationwide have assessed LFOs in ways that 
clearly reflect their increasing reliance on funding from some of the poorest 
defendants who appear before them. . . . Because many court and criminal jus-
tice systems are inadequately funded, judges view LFOs as a critical revenue 
stream.”). The Council of State Governments recommended that states “[c]urb 
the extent to which the operations of criminal justice agencies rely on the col-
lection of fines, fees, and surcharges from people released from prisons and 
jails.” MCLEAN & THOMPSON, supra note 2, at 34. The National Center for 
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Agencies and private providers have perverse incentive to 
collect fees even if it damages offenders’ chances of rehabilita-
tion and reintegration. Supervision can become primarily an 
exercise in fee collection rather than the provision of services. It 
is common practice to extend probation terms for nonpayment 
of financial penalties, even if all other probation conditions 
have been met—and it may be to an agency’s advantage to keep 
“paying customers” on probation or parole even if early termi-
nation would otherwise be warranted. In addition, offenders 
are often barred from participating in needed treatment pro-
grams when they are unable to pay required program fees.
86
 
It used to be said that probation officers struggled with the 
necessity of “wearing two hats” in the performance of their jobs: 
that of the cop and of the social worker. Now there is a third 
hat: the bill collector, conjuring images of a Dickensian Mr. 
Pancks.
87
 Some probation agencies have reported that they re-
 
State Courts has admonished that the concept of self-supporting courts “is not 
consistent with judicial ethics or the demands of due process.” ROBERT W. 
TOBIN, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, FUNDING THE STATE COURTS: ISSUES 
AND APPROACHES 50 (1996). The American Bar Association has recommended 
that courts should have “a predictable general funding stream that is not tied 
to fee generation.” AM. BAR ASS’N, BLACK LETTER RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 
ABA COMMISSION ON STATE COURT FUNDING 7 (2004). One essential reform is 
to ensure that the agency of government that imposes and collects costs and 
fees not be the agency that benefits from those monies. See AM. CIVIL 
LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 2, at 28 (“[T]o eliminate judicial incentives to 
assess high fines and fees against defendants . . . revenue should be paid into 
the city’s general budget, not earmarked for the courts.”). The species of con-
flict of interest noted here may be especially problematic when payment obli-
gations are imposed and administered by private service providers rather than 
governmental entities, such as private prisons and jails, and private correc-
tional-treatment contractors. See id. at 64. 
 86. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 2, at 35 (reporting that 
“courts frequently extend individuals’ probation on the ground of nonpayment 
of these fees or costs, even though no state statutes specifically authorize 
courts to extend probation on this ground”); BANNON ET AL., supra note 2, at 
25 (finding that thirteen of fifteen states studied allowed probation terms to be 
extended for failure to pay off criminal justice debt).  
 87. The allusion is to CHARLES DICKENS, LITTLE DORRIT 797 (Oxford 
Univ. Press 1970) (1857). The “Patriarch” Mr. Casby repeatedly told his rent 
collector in Bleeding Heart Yard, a deeply impoverished London neighborhood: 
“You are made for nothing else, Mr. Pancks. . . . You are paid to squeeze and 
you must squeeze to pay.” Id. For a description of the bill-collector function of 
community supervision officers, see BANNON ET AL., supra note 2, at 31 
(“Collection-related tasks include monitoring payments, setting up payment 
plans, dunning persons under supervision, and taking punitive actions such as 
reporting failures to pay. Even when jurisdictions do not typically seek proba-
tion revocation solely on the basis of nonpayment, many interviewees reported 
that supervision officers will threaten revocation in an effort to encourage 
payments. . . . These enforcement responsibilities can be a distraction from the 
more important duties that probation and parole officers have. In particular, 
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ceive as much as fifty percent of their budgets through the col-
lection of user fees—and many private probation contractors 
subsist entirely on monies wrung out of supervised offenders.
88
 
There are reports of agencies collecting fees in excess of their 
actual expenditures on particular offenders—and protections 
against such practices are virtually nonexistent. In some cases, 
institutional priorities to collect self-sustaining user fees can 
cut the chances that victims will receive full restitution. By an-
ecdotal report, these dynamics can add up to excruciating dis-
comfort among conscientious probation and parole officers and 
administrators—they know the user-fee system is counterpro-
ductive and unfair, but they also know their agencies cannot 
survive without it.
89
 
It is often said that, without the support of supervision fees 
and reimbursements, important services and rehabilitative 
programs would not be available to probationers and parolees.
90
 
This mobilizes the treacherous argument that user fees are ac-
tually for offenders’ “own good.” American criminal justice poli-
cymakers have good historical reason to beware of this trope.
91
 
We should pause to reflect on how strange an argument this is 
as it plays out in the lives of offenders. 
As a group, convicted offenders still under the jurisdiction 
of the criminal courts may be the worst candidates in America 
 
given their often crushing caseloads, their highest priority is to promote public 
safety and monitor individuals at risk of re-offending. Supervision officers are 
aware of these consequences and some find debt collection to be at odds with 
their main purpose: to serve society by ensuring that individuals do not com-
mit new offenses.”); see also Corbett, supra note 8, at 1712 (quoting former 
Texas Probation Director Dan Beto as saying “with [the] introduction of these 
financial conditions of probation, the role of the probation officer changed; no 
longer are they agents of change, but rather they have assumed the job of col-
lection agent. I am aware of some probation departments where more empha-
sis is placed on probation officer collection rates than probation success 
rates.”). 
 88. See Petersilia, supra note 43, at 171. 
 89. The original Code hinted at a similar view of the conflict-of-interest 
problem—although it was a significantly smaller problem in 1962 than it is 
today. As explained in the official Comment to original section 7.02: “The use 
of a fine also has distinctly negative value for the administration of penal law 
when its real rationale is the financial advantage of the agency levying the fi-
ne.” MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES PART I §§ 6.01–7.09, 7.02 cmt. 1 
(1985). 
 90. See supra note 54. 
 91. DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM 
AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESS OF AMERICA (2002) (giving an account of 
the excesses of indeterminate sentencing and the uncritical attitude often tak-
en toward repressive measures that could be prettified as being in offenders’ 
best interests). 
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to be designated as special taxpayers to make up shortfalls in 
legislative appropriations for correctional programming. They 
by and large come from the lowest rungs of the economic ladder 
and are struggling with the stark employment-market disad-
vantages that come along with criminal convictions. State and 
federal laws bar them from many jobs or job-related licenses. 
Much more powerfully, private employers are reluctant to hire 
persons with criminal records—an effect that appears to espe-
cially disadvantage African Americans.
92
 To require offenders to 
pay for government interventions that are forced upon them is 
regressive taxation taken to an extreme. 
The situation might be better if we had confidence that the 
surveillance, control, and services performed by correctional 
agencies were beneficial to their subjects. It is surprisingly dif-
ficult, however, to show reliable improvements in people’s lives 
because they have undergone sentences of prison, jail, proba-
tion, or parole. Professionals within the criminal justice system 
assume too readily the worth of their own interventions, while 
having limited exposure to the life circumstances of their clien-
tele. Ron Corbett has written (for this issue of the Minnesota 
Law Review) that must recognize forget that many offenders 
are “flat broke.”
93
 The majority of offenders consider the imposi-
tion of fees to be unfair—and these perceptions of injustice 
work against the process of rehabilitation.
94
 Considering the 
hardship imposed on broke offenders when correctional fees are 
assessed and vigorously collected, and the uncertain benefits 
offenders receive, they are not getting their money’s worth. 
The Code includes a number of second-order recommenda-
tions for jurisdictions that cannot wholly discontinue their sys-
tems of user fees. Together, they make up a muscular program. 
First, under the Code’s RFS standard, no costs or fees may be 
imposed unless the offender would retain sufficient means for 
reasonable living expenses and family obligations after their 
payment.
95
 This will eliminate the imposition of many costs, 
 
 92. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS 
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); DEVAH PAGER, 
MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS 
INCARCERATION (2007). 
 93. See Corbett, supra note 8, at 1713. (“[I]f you’re on probation in the 
large urban areas, where most probationers reside, you’re often flat broke.”). 
 94. Pleggenkuhle, supra note 2, at 126–27. 
 95. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04(6) (Tentative Draft No. 3, 
2014). In addition, alternative section 6.04D(2) provides: “The purposes of 
costs, fees, and assessments are to defray the expenses incurred by the state 
as a result of the defendant’s criminal conduct or incurred to provide correc-
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fees, and surcharges in the first instance. Second, the new Code 
provides that all costs and fees must be approved in advance by 
sentencing courts, and may not be levied, increased, or supple-
mented with surcharges at a later time. In a related provision, 
sentencing courts are required to set a total dollar ceiling upon 
all financial sanctions that may be collected from an individual 
defendant. Third, no costs, fees, or assessments may be im-
posed in excess of actual expenditures in the offender’s case.
96
 
Fourth, the agencies or entities charged with collection of the 
fees are barred from retaining the monies collected, and collec-
tion surcharges or penalties may not be added to the amounts 
owed.
97
 Fifth, the imposition of costs, fees, and assessments 
 
tional services to offenders, without placing a substantial burden on the de-
fendant’s ability to reintegrate into the law-abiding community.” Id. § 6.04D, 
Alternative § 6.04D(2).  
 96. Id. § 6.04D, Alternative § 6.04D(3) (“No costs, fees, or assessments 
may be imposed by any agency or entity in the absence of approval by the sen-
tencing court.”). 
 97. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04(8) cmt. j (Tentative Draft 
No. 3, 2014) (“§ 6.04(8) states that, ‘The agencies or entities charged with col-
lection of economic sanctions may not be the recipients of monies collected and 
may not impose fees on offenders for delinquent payments or services ren-
dered.’ Subsection (8) also makes specific reference to the problem of late fees, 
payment-plan fees, and interest charges against offenders who are unable to 
make immediate payment of costs, fees, and assessments. These so-called 
‘poverty penalties’ can add up to appreciable sums. For example, among cur-
rent state laws, 30 to 40 percent surcharges for delinquent payments are 
common, while some states or collections agencies impose late fees ranging 
from $10 to $300 per missed payment. Some states also charge offenders fees 
for entering into payment plans, without exemption for poverty.”). See 
BANNON ET AL., supra note 2, at 17–18 (“In thirteen states [of the fifteen 
states in the study], individuals can be charged interest or late fees if they fall 
behind on payments—even if they lack any resources to make the payments or 
have conflicting obligations such as child support. The added debt can be sig-
nificant . . . .”). For examples of “poverty penalties” in the form of late fees, see 
ALA. CODE § 12-17-225.4 (2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-116.03 (2015); CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 1214.1(a) (West 2014); FLA. STAT. § 28.246(6) (2014); 70 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 5/5-9-3(e) (2014); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-321(b)(1) (2011); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 2335.19(B) (West 2002); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9730.1(b)(2) 
(2012); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 103.0031(b) (West 2005). For examples of 
payment-plan fees, see FLA. STAT. § 28.24(26)(b)–(c) (2014); VA. CODE ANN.  
§ 19.2-354(A) (2012).  
The principle in section 6.04(8) is also reflected in specific provisions relat-
ing to asset forfeitures and criminal justice costs, fees, and assessments. See 
MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04C(2) (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2014) 
(“The legitimate purposes of asset forfeitures do not include the generation of 
revenue for law-enforcement agencies.”); id. § 6.04C(5) (“A state or local law-
enforcement agency that has seized forfeitable assets may not retain the as-
sets, or proceeds from the assets, for its own use.”); id. § 6.04D(1), First Alter-
native § 6.04D(1) (“No convicted offender, or participant in a deferred prosecu-
tion under § 6.02A, or participant in a deferred adjudication under § 6.02B, 
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cannot violate statutory principles of sentence proportionality, 
under which all economic sanctions must be aggregated with 
other sentence provisions and may not in total be dispropor-
tionate to the seriousness of the underlying offense.
98
 Sixth, the 
Code provides that economic sanctions other than victim resti-
tution may not be made formal “conditions” of probation or 
postrelease supervision—meaning that nonpayment cannot be 
a basis for sentence revocation.
99
  
In most jurisdictions, this combination of safeguards would 
work a major improvement in the administration of costs, fees, 
and assessments, even assuming the Code’s first-order recom-
mendation of total abolition has been rejected or postponed. 
  CONCLUSION   
Unlike many other parts of the Model Penal Code (Second), 
the new economic sanctions provisions are not inspired by in-
novations or reforms that have been tried in a number of 
states, whose successes and failures can be evaluated with con-
fidence. There is no stock of “best practices” to be the founda-
tion for model legislation. Nor is the new MPC based on solid 
empirical research into the effects of financial penalties on of-
fenders and recidivism rates, because no such knowledge ex-
ists. Instead, the Code has relied on the emerging literature on 
the pell-mell growth of economic sanctions and their practical 
effects on the lives of offenders—including their work lives, 
families, and abilities to keep their heads above water in a 
struggling economy when burdened by a criminal record. Jessi-
ca Eaglin and Barry Ruback, also contributors to this issue of 
the Minnesota Law Review, are among the few researchers who 
have drawn attention to these issues. Alexes Harris has also 
been a leading voice, along with Katherine Beckett and others 
represented in the footnotes to this Article. We are fortunate 
that the existing studies, if small in quantity, have been of high 
 
shall be held responsible for the payment of costs, fees, and assessments.”); id. 
§ 6.04D cmt. d (“In current law, the agencies that impose costs, fees, and as-
sessments are frequently the beneficiaries of any funds received. The Code 
treats this as a conflict of interest . . . .”). 
 98. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.02(4) (Tentative Draft No. 3, 
2014); MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2)(a)(i) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 
2007). 
 99. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.03(8)(i) (Tentative Draft 
No. 3, 2014) (stating that permissible conditions of probation include “[g]ood-
faith efforts to make payment of victim compensation under § 6.04A, but com-
pliance with any other economic sanction shall not be a permissible condition 
of probation”); id. § 6.09(8)(i) (representing the parallel provision for 
postrelease supervision). 
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quality. Now joined by the MPC, they make the case that 
America’s economic sanctioning policies deserve a share of the 
attention that is usually given to other forms of punishment. 
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APPENDIX A 
MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING 
Approved & Recommended Economic Sanctions Provisions 
(Current through Feb. 2015) 
Economic sanctions provisions from Tentative Draft No. 3 
(Apr. 24, 2014) (approved with amendments at the American 
Law Institute 2014 Annual Meeting, May 19, 2014); and revised 
section 6.04A from Preliminary Draft No. 10 (Sept. 3, 2014) 
(Reporters’ recommendations, not yet approved by the American 
Law Institute) 
§ 6.04. Economic Sanctions; General Provisions.
100
 
(1) The court may impose a sentence that includes one or 
more economic sanctions under §§ 6.04A through 6.04D for any 
felony or misdemeanor. 
(2) The court shall fix the total amount of all economic 
sanctions that may be imposed on an offender, and no agency 
or entity may assess or collect economic sanctions in excess of 
the amount approved by the court. 
(3) The court may require immediate payment of an eco-
nomic sanction when the offender has sufficient means to do so, 
or may order payment in installments. 
(4) The time period for enforcement of an economic sanc-
tion [other than victim restitution]
101
 shall not exceed three 
years from the date sentence is imposed or the offender is re-
leased from incarceration, whichever is later. If an economic 
sanction has not been paid as required, it may be reduced to 
the form of a civil judgment. 
(5) When imposing economic sanctions, the court shall ap-
ply any relevant sentencing guidelines. 
 
 100. This Section was approved as amended by vote of the ALI membership 
at the 2014 Annual Meeting. Before amendment, subsection (6) provided as 
follows: “(6) No economic sanction [other than victim compensation] may be 
imposed unless the offender would retain sufficient means for reasonable liv-
ing expenses and family obligations after compliance with the sanction.” 
 101. A note on terminology is needed here. Tentative Draft No. 3 contained 
numerous references to “victim compensation” when referring to payments 
made by offenders to victims as part of sentencing proceedings. This language 
has been changed throughout this Appendix. In current drafting, the term 
“victim compensation” has been replaced by the more familiar term “victim 
restitution”—except where the draft refers to victim compensation funds ad-
ministered by state agencies outside the court system. The Reporters received 
nearly unanimous feedback that the use of the word “compensation” to mean 
“restitution” by offenders was confusing and contrary to familiar usage. See 
MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04A and Comment (Preliminary Draft 
No. 10, 2014). 
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(6) No economic sanction may be imposed unless the of-
fender would retain sufficient means for reasonable living ex-
penses and family obligations after compliance with the sanc-
tion. 
(7) If the court refrains from imposing an economic sanc-
tion because of the limitation in subsection (6), the court may 
not substitute a prison sanction for the unavailable economic 
sanction. 
(8) The agencies or entities charged with collection of eco-
nomic sanctions may not be the recipients of monies collected 
and may not impose fees on offenders for delinquent payments 
or services rendered. 
(9) The courts are encouraged to offer incentives to offend-
ers who meet identified goals toward satisfaction of economic 
sanctions, such as payment of installments within a designated 
time period. Incentives contemplated by this subsection include 
shortening of a probation or postrelease-supervision term, re-
moval or lightening of sentence conditions, and full or partial 
forgiveness of economic sanctions [other than victim restitu-
tion]. 
(10) If the court imposes multiple economic sanctions in-
cluding victim restitution, the court shall order that payment of 
victim restitution take priority over the other economic sanc-
tions. 
(11) The court may modify or remove an economic sanction 
at any time. The court shall modify an economic sanction found 
to be inconsistent with this Section.  
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§ 6.04A. Victim Restitution.
102
 
(1) The sentencing court may order that the offender make 
restitution to the victim for economic losses suffered as a direct 
result of the offense of conviction, provided the amount of resti-
tution can be calculated with reasonable accuracy. 
(2) The purposes of victim restitution are to compensate 
victims for injuries suffered as a direct result of criminal con-
duct and promote offenders’ rehabilitation and reintegration in-
to the law-abiding community through the making of amends 
to crime victims. Victim restitution may not be imposed for the 
purpose of punishment. 
(3) For purposes of this Section, a “victim” is any person 
who has suffered direct physical, emotional, or financial harm 
as the result of the commission or attempted commission of a 
criminal offense. If dead or incapacitated, the victim may be 
represented by the victim’s estate, spouse, parent, legal guardi-
an, natural or adopted child, sibling, grandparent, significant 
other, or other lawful representative, as determined by the sen-
tencing court. 
(4) “Economic losses” under this Section include the cost of 
 
 102. This Section has been revised since Tentative Draft No. 3 (an earlier 
version of section 6.04A approved with one amendment, May 19, 2014) and 
has not itself been approved. The revised section 6.04A was first presented in 
Preliminary Draft No. 10 (Sept. 3, 2014). None of the changes suggested by the 
Reporters in the newly-revised section 6.04A subtracts from the substance of 
the provision that was approved at the 2014 Annual Meeting, but the revised 
provision contains much new material. The black-letter text will no doubt be 
revised substantially before being formally approved. All of the revisions pro-
posed in Preliminary Draft No. 10 contain implementation detail urged upon 
the Reporters by many members in their comments from the floor at the An-
nual Meeting. The pre-meeting draft of the provision read as follows: 
§ 6.04A. Victim Compensation [terminology later changed to “Victim 
Restitution”]. 
  (1) The court shall order victim compensation when a crime victim 
has suffered injuries that would support an award of compensatory 
damages under state law, if the amount of compensation can be calcu-
lated with reasonable accuracy. 
  (2) The purposes of victim compensation are to compensate crime 
victims for injuries suffered as a result of criminal conduct and pro-
mote offenders’ rehabilitation and reintegration into the law-abiding 
community through the making of amends to crime victims. 
  (3) When an offender has caused losses that would be compensa-
ble under this Section, but there is no identifiable victim in the case, 
the offender may be ordered to make an equivalent payment into a 
victims’ compensation fund. 
MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04A (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2014). By 
vote of the membership at the 2014 Annual Meeting, imposition of victim res-
titution was made discretionary rather than mandatory. Thus, the word 
“shall” in subsection (1) above was changed to “may.” 
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replacing or repairing property, reasonable expenses related to 
medical care, dental care, mental-health care, and rehabilita-
tion, loss of income, and reasonable funeral expenses. 
(5) “Economic losses” under this Section do not include 
general, exemplary, or punitive damages, losses that require 
estimation of consequential damages, such as pain and suffer-
ing or lost profits, or losses attributable to victims’ failure to 
take reasonable steps to mitigate their losses. 
(6) The sentencing court shall take the financial circum-
stances of the defendant into consideration when deciding 
whether to order victim restitution under this Section and the 
amount of the order; and, if necessary to comply with § 6.04(6), 
the sentencing court shall order partial restitution to the victim 
or shall refrain from awarding restitution. 
(7) When more than one victim has suffered economic loss-
es as a direct result of the offense of conviction, the court shall 
determine priority among the victims on the basis of the seri-
ousness of the losses each victim has suffered, their economic 
circumstances, and other equitable considerations. 
(8) When the criminal conduct of more than one person has 
caused a victim’s economic losses under this Section, including 
persons not before the court, the court shall set the amount of 
restitution owed by an individual offender to reflect his or her 
relative role in the causal process that brought about the vic-
tim’s losses. In exercising its discretion under this subsection, 
the sentencing court should consider the following factors:  
(a) The number of persons believed to have contributed 
to the victim’s total economic losses. 
(b) The degree to which the offender played a direct or 
major role, relative to other persons, in bringing about the vic-
tim’s total economic losses. 
(c) Any other facts relevant to the defendant’s relative 
causal role in bringing about the victim’s economic losses. 
(9) The sentencing court shall determine the amount of 
losses payable by the defendant in the instant case by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. 
(10) A restitution order under this Section shall not pre-
clude the victim from proceeding in a civil action to recover 
damages from the offender. Any amount paid to a victim under 
this Section shall be set off against any amount later recovered 
as compensatory damages by the victim in a civil proceeding. If 
the victim has recovered economic losses as defined in this Sec-
tion prior to sentencing, the court shall give credit for that re-
covery when calculating the amount of restitution to be ordered 
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at sentencing.  
(11) When an offender has caused economic losses that 
would be payable as restitution under this Section, but there is 
no identifiable victim in the case, the sentencing court may or-
der the offender to make an equivalent payment into the state’s 
victims’ compensation fund. 
§ 6.04B. Fines.
103
 
(1) A person who has been convicted of an offense may be 
sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding: 
(a) [$200,000] in the case of a felony of the first degree; 
(b) [$100,000] in the case of a felony of the second de-
gree; 
(c) [$50,000] in the case of a felony of the third degree; 
(d) [$25,000] in the case of a felony of the fourth degree; 
(e) [$10,000] in the case of a felony of the fifth degree; 
 [The number and gradations of maximum authorized fine 
amounts will depend on the number of felony grades created in 
§ 6.01.] 
(f) [$5,000] in the case of a misdemeanor; and 
(g) [$1,000] in the case of a petty misdemeanor. 
(h) An amount up to [three times] the pecuniary gain 
derived from the offense by the offender or [three times] the 
loss or damage suffered by crime victims as a result of the of-
fense of conviction. 
(2) The purposes of fines are to exact proportionate pun-
ishments and further the goals of general deterrence and of-
fender rehabilitation without placing a substantial burden on 
the defendant’s ability to reintegrate into the law-abiding 
community. 
(3) The [sentencing commission] [state supreme court] is 
authorized to promulgate a means-based fine plan. Means-
based fines, for purposes of this Section, are fines that are ad-
justed in amount in relation to the wealth and/or income of de-
fendants, so that the punitive force of financial penalties will be 
comparable for offenders of varying economic means. One ex-
ample of a means-based fine contemplated in this Section is the 
 
 103. This Section was approved as amended by vote of the ALI membership 
at the 2014 Annual Meeting. Subsection (1)(h) was amended to reduce the 
multipliers stated in brackets from five to three. The pre-meeting draft of sub-
section (1)(h) provided for maximum fines in “[a]n amount up to [five times] 
the pecuniary gain derived from the offense by the offender or [five times] the 
loss or damage suffered by crime victims as a result of the offense of convic-
tion.” MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04B(1)(h) (Tentative Draft No. 3, 
2014).  
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“day fine,” which assigns fine amounts with reference to units 
of an offender’s daily net income. 
(4) Means-based fine amounts shall be calculated with ref-
erence to:  
(a) the purposes in subsection (2); and  
(b) the net income of the defendant, adjusted for the 
number of dependents supported by the defendant, or other cri-
teria reasonably calculated to measure the wealth, income, and 
family obligations of the defendant. 
(5) Means-based fines under the plan may exceed the max-
imum fine amounts in subsection (1). 
(6) The means-based fine plan must include procedures to 
provide the courts with reasonably accurate information about 
the defendant’s financial circumstances as needed for the calcu-
lation of means-based fine amounts. 
(7) A means-based fine shall function as a substitute for a 
fine that could otherwise have been imposed under subsection 
(1), and may not be imposed in addition to such a fine.  
§ 6.04C. Asset Forfeitures.
104
 
(1) The sentencing court may order that assets be forfeited 
following an offender’s conviction for a felony offense. [This Sec-
tion sets out the exclusive process for asset forfeitures in the 
state and supersedes other provisions in state or local law, ex-
cept that civil and administrative processes for the forfeiture of 
stolen property and contraband are not affected by this Sec-
tion.] 
(2) The purposes of asset forfeitures are to incapacitate of-
fenders from criminal conduct that requires the forfeited assets 
for its commission, and to deter offenses by reducing their re-
wards and increasing their costs. The legitimate purposes of 
asset forfeitures do not include the generation of revenue for 
law-enforcement agencies. 
(3) Assets subject to forfeiture include: 
(a) proceeds and property derived from the commission 
of the offense; 
(b) proceeds and property directly traceable to proceeds 
and property derived from the commission of the offense; and 
(c) instrumentalities used by the defendant or the de-
fendant’s accomplices or co-conspirators in the commission of 
the offense. 
(4) Assets subject to forfeiture under subsection (3)(c), in 
 
 104. This Section was approved at the 2014 Annual Meeting without 
amendment. 
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which third parties are partial or joint owners, may not be for-
feited unless the third parties have been convicted of offenses 
for which forfeiture of the assets is an authorized sanction.  
(5) Forfeited assets, and proceeds from those assets, shall 
be deposited into [the victims-compensation fund]. A state or 
local law-enforcement agency that has seized forfeitable assets 
may not retain the assets, or proceeds from the assets, for its 
own use. If a state or local law-enforcement agency receives for-
feited assets, or proceeds from those assets, from any other 
governmental agency or department, including any federal 
agency or department, such assets or proceeds shall be deposit-
ed into [the victims-compensation fund] and may not be re-
tained by the receiving state or local law-enforcement agency. 
§ 6.04D. Costs, Fees, and Assessments.
105
 
(1) No convicted offender, or participant in a deferred pros-
ecution under § 6.02A, or participant in a deferred adjudication 
under § 6.02B, shall be held responsible for the payment of 
costs, fees, and assessments.  
(2) Costs, fees, and assessments, within the meaning of 
this Section, include financial obligations imposed by law-
enforcement agencies, public-defender agencies, courts, correc-
tions departments, and corrections providers to defray expenses 
associated with the investigation and prosecution of the offend-
er or correctional services provided to the offender.  
Alternative § 6.04D. Costs, Fees, and Assessments. 
(1) Costs, fees, and assessments, within the meaning of 
this Section, include financial obligations imposed by law-
enforcement agencies, public-defender agencies, courts, correc-
tions departments, and corrections providers to defray expenses 
associated with the investigation and prosecution of the offend-
er or correctional services provided to the offender. 
(2) The purposes of costs, fees, and assessments are to de-
fray the expenses incurred by the state as a result of the de-
fendant’s criminal conduct or incurred to provide correctional 
services to offenders, without placing a substantial burden on 
the defendant’s ability to reintegrate into the law-abiding 
community.  
(3) No costs, fees, or assessments may be imposed by any 
agency or entity in the absence of approval by the sentencing 
court. 
(4) No costs, fees, or assessments may be imposed in excess 
 
 105. This Section was approved at the 2014 Annual Meeting without 
amendment. 
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of actual expenditures in the offender’s case. 
2015] ECONOMIC REHABILITATION 1775 
 
APPENDIX B 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF MODEL PENAL CODE ECONOMIC 
SANCTIONS PROVISIONS 
The drafting history of the Model Penal Code’s five eco-
nomic sanctions provisions (see Appendix A) is no more com-
plex than any other subject area of the revised Code, which is 
to say it is quite convoluted. This Appendix explains how the 
provisions arrived at their current shape, and what remains to 
be done before they are finalized. 
This Appendix is also meant to guide the unwary reader 
through recent drafting—with instructions on which drafts 
have been approved or changed. Completists who want to be 
up-to-date on every word of black-letter drafting and commen-
tary relating to economic sanctions must look at three docu-
ments: 
This Article, Appendix A (for all current black-letter draft-
ing); MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING §§ 6.04—6.04D (Tenta-
tive Draft No. 3, 2014); and MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING 
§ 6.04C (Preliminary Draft No. 10, 2014) with accompanying 
Comments and Reporters’ Notes.
106
 
I. WHAT TO READ, WHAT TO IGNORE  
A. BLACK-LETTER PROVISIONS 
For all of the current black-letter drafting for the Code’s 
new economic sanctions provisions, there is one-stop shopping. 
See Appendix A to this Article. Every provision in the appendix 
has been approved and represents official American Law Insti-
tute policy except section 6.04A on victim restitution, which 
 
 106. Because Preliminary Draft No. 10 will soon be updated and revised, 
the important principle is to locate the latest document in the drafting cycle 
that will conclude with Tentative Draft No. 4 (probable approval 2016). As of 
this writing, the most current document is Preliminary Draft No. 10 (Sept. 3, 
2014) (the first document or the Reporters’ “opening bid” in the Tentative 
Draft No. 4 drafting cycle). There are likely to be two or three interim drafts 
between Preliminary Draft No. 10 and the finalized Tentative Draft No. 4.  
Because readers may encounter this Article months or years in the future, 
the recommended procedure for bringing oneself up to date is this: (1) If the 
MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING project has been completed, the multi-
volume hardback set with the full revised Code is obviously the authoritative 
source. If the hardback volumes do not yet exist: (2) look for a final, approved 
Tentative Draft No. 4 (probably May 2016). If no such final document yet ex-
ists: (3) look for the most recent of the new drafts on the ALI website’s project 
page. The most recent draft may be called a Preliminary Draft, a Council 
Draft, or a Discussion Draft—all of these are the [ALI’s] denominations of 
work-in-progress drafts leading up to a Tentative Draft. 
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remains a work-in-progress. Appendix A contains no commen-
tary, just black-letter recommended statutory language. 
B. COMMENTARY 
For background commentary and research, Tentative Draft 
No. 3 is the best starting place, but caveat lector. Three of the 
economic sanctions sections in that draft were amended by vote 
of the membership at the ALI’s 2014 Annual Meeting—and two 
of the amendments were important policy reversals. In addi-
tion, the former victim restitution provision in Tentative Draft 
No. 3 (called “victim compensation” in that draft) has since 
been entirely rewritten. As a result of these changes, some of 
the commentary in Tentative Draft No. 3 is not authoritative 
and supports sub-provisions that have been changed—in two 
cases—by one hundred eighty degrees.  
For the most recent commentary on where the drafting 
stands—and an explanation of all the changes since Tentative 
Draft No. 3, see MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04A (Pre-
liminary Draft No. 10, 2014) and Comment and Reporters’ 
Note.
107
 
II. WHAT WAS CHANGED AND WHEN  
A full set of economic sanctions provisions was submitted 
for approval in May 2014 in Tentative Draft No. 3, and most of 
this content was approved. There were several drafts leading 
up to Tentative Draft No. 3, with changes introduced in each 
successive draft.
108
 
Most of the economic sanctions provisions in Tentative 
Draft No. 3 were formally approved on May 19, 2014, exactly as 
they appear in that draft. Three amendments to the economic 
sanctions sections were approved by vote of the membership at 
the 2014 Annual Meeting, amounting to official amendments of 
 
 107. See the preceding footnote on how to search out updates following Pre-
liminary Draft No. 10. 
 108. For example, the Reporters initially proposed that sentencing courts 
should not be authorized to impose the sanction of victim restitution “unless 
the offender would retain sufficient means for reasonable living expenses and 
family obligations after compliance with the sanction.” See MODEL PENAL 
CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04 (Preliminary Draft No. 8, 2013). This provision was 
later changed to add language that would require a restitution award even if 
the offender’s financial circumstances did not meet the reasonable-living-
expenses threshold. The change was made in response to feedback from the 
Advisers, the Members’ Consultative Group, and the ALI Council. But then 
victim restitution was changed back to a discretionary sanction by vote of the 
membership at the 2014 Annual Meeting. 
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Tentative Draft No. 3. The changes were in sections 6.04(6), 
6.04A(1), and 6.04B(1)(h). The post-amendment language of 
each of these subsections is included in Appendix A with foot-
notes that rehearse the pre-amendment language. 
In addition, although there was no formal vote of the mem-
bership requiring the Reporters to do so, we have completely 
rewritten section 6.04A on victim restitution, with the Report-
ers’ recommendation that it replace the version of that section 
contained in Tentative Draft No. 3. At the 2014 Annual Meet-
ing, ALI members raised many questions about implementa-
tion of the restitution provision that the Reporters were unable 
to answer.
109
 The rewrite of that section does not represent a 
change in policy—but is the Reporters’ response to many sug-
gestions that the provision should give additional guidance to 
state legislatures on issues such as the definition of recoverable 
losses, joint and several liability, and the relationship between 
a restitution award in criminal court and civil proceedings 
brought against offenders by victims. 
The reworked section 6.04A has not yet been approved by 
the ALI and will no doubt be amended en route to final adop-
tion. The Reporters’ suggestions do not unsettle the core policy 
decisions at the 2014 Annual Meeting (to approve restitution as 
a criminal sanction, to have it be a discretionary sanction, and 
to have it subject to the reasonable financial subsistence limita-
tion). 
In sum, all economic sanctions provisions have been ap-
proved and represent official ALI policy except the new lan-
guage of section 6.04A. 
 
 
 
 109. The economic sanctions provisions have been my responsibility, so 
none of the blame for the original inadequacy of the restitution provision 
should be placed on my Associate Reporter Cecelia Klingele. 
